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             ABSTRACT 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Given the growing effect that globalisation and integration has had upon economies and 
regions, the process of monetary union has become an increasingly topical issue in 
economic policy debates. This has been driven in part by the experience and successes of 
the European Monetary Union (EMU), which is widely perceived as beneficial to 
member countries. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) is an 
example of a group of countries that has realised that there are benefits that may arise 
from economic integration.  
 
This paper makes use of an interest-rate pass through model to investigate whether the 
pass-through of monetary policy transmission in ten SADC countries has become more 
similar between January 1990 and December 2007 using monthly interest rate data. This 
is done to determine the extent of macroeconomic convergence that prevails within 
SADC, and consequently establish whether the formation of a regional monetary union is 
feasible.  
 
The results of the empirical pass-through model were robust and show that there are 
certain countries that have a more efficient and similar monetary transmission process 
than others. In particular, the countries that form the Common Monetary Area (CMA) 
and the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) tend to show evidence of convergence 
in monetary policy transmission, especially since 2000. In addition, from analysis of the 
long-run pass-through, the results reveal that there is evidence that Malawi and Zambia 
have shown signs of convergence toward the countries that form the CMA and SACU, in 
terms of monetary policy transmission.  
 
The study concludes that a SADC wide monetary union is currently not feasible based on 
the evidence provided from the results of the pass-through analysis. Despite this, it can be 
tentatively suggested that the CMA may be expanded to include Botswana, Malawi and 
Zambia.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.1. CONTEXT OF THE STUDY 
 
From economic literature it is clear that globalisation has had a large impact on the world 
economy over the past three decades. However, for developing countries the forces of 
globalisation only became more distinct from the late 1980’s and early 1990’s. 
Furthermore, it is of interest to note that the degree to which globalisation causes 
domestic economies to move together (converge) within a region, such as SADC, has 
concerned policy makers (Kabundi and Loots, 2005:1).  
 
Given the growing effect that globalisation and integration has had upon economies and 
regions, the process of forming a monetary union has become an increasingly topical 
issue in economic policy debates. This is believed to have been driven in part by the 
experience and successes of the EMU which is widely perceived as being beneficial to 
member countries (Jefferis, 2007:83). According to Maruping (2005:132), the basic 
objective that has underpinned the move toward regional integration is to centralise 
economic and monetary policy, and as a derivative form a monetary union. Furthermore, 
within Africa there have been several recent monetary integration initiatives and one of 
the stated goals of the African Union (AU) is to formulate a monetary union consisting of 
a common currency and one central bank for the entire continent by 2025 (Rossouw, 
2006a:382).  
 
This process of monetary unification is to be achieved in stages, starting with each of the 
sub-regions of the African continent forming regional monetary unions as intermediate 
goals toward an African Monetary Union (Masson and Pattillo, 2004:9). In particular, the 
various intermediate stages include macroeconomic convergence, monetary integration 
and monetary union at the regional level, following which the regional unions would 
eventually form a full African Monetary Union with a single central bank and a single 
currency (Jefferis, 2007:83). However, in order to develop such a monetary union similar 
to that found in the European Union (EU) it will be necessary to pursue policies that 
support the various stages that need to be completed.  
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Maruping (2005:129) maintains that although some African countries have only recently 
rekindled their interest in economic integration, it is interesting to note that the reason for 
such a renewed interest is not related to the initial decolonisation or political agendas and 
the desire to overcome ‘artificial’ boundaries. Rather, the inspiration for such a 
movement stems from the success of integration efforts noticed in Europe as well as the 
Americas. Thus, the desire to integrate tends to stem from an economic, rather than a 
political perspective. However, according to Hawkins and Masson (2003:4), the 
economic benefits that arise from the formation of a monetary union are still subject to 
intense debate. 
 
SADC is an example of a group of countries that has realised that there are certain 
benefits that may arise from economic integration. SADC has already undergone the 
process of setting macroeconomic convergence criteria that will steer the region toward 
monetary unification and a single central bank. According to Khamfula and 
Tesfayohannes (2004:41), a vital step in transforming SADC into a monetary union is to 
establish a single central bank which will not only issue a single currency for all member 
nations, but will also pool their foreign exchange reserves and co-ordinate their monetary 
policies. To consider matters regarding the establishment of a single central bank the 
Committee of Central Bank Governors (CCBG) of SADC has been given the 
responsibility of monitoring the progression of macroeconomic convergence within the 
region. This is an essential role as satisfactory progress is vital if the goals of forming a 
monetary union by 2016 and the introduction of a single currency by 2018 within SADC 
are to be achieved (Rossouw, 2006a:382).  
 
Traditionally, macroeconomic convergence has focused on certain maximum allowable 
levels for some key economic indicators that are related to fiscal discipline and monetary 
and financial stability (Maruping, 2005:136). While macroeconomic convergence is an 
important stage in the development of a monetary union, there is debate as to the level of 
convergence that has to occur prior to the union taking place, as well as how much can 
follow after the union is formed. Jefferis (2007:89) suggests that because the 
macroeconomic indicators are primarily monetary in nature (inflation, interest rates and 
exchange rates), there are arguments that convergence should come prior to monetary 
union, as otherwise convergence will be abruptly forced as the union takes effect. 
However, it has been argued for reasons such as structural factors that convergence may 
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follow monetary union, hence, making convergence endogenous (Jefferis, 2007:90). 
Furthermore, Jefferis (2007:90) suggests that this argument remains controversial, 
although, it is important to understand that both extensive monetary and structural 
convergence is a prerequisite for monetary union.  
 
The majority of studies that have been conducted with regard to macroeconomic 
convergence and monetary unification among SADC countries lack an empirical 
component (cf. McCarthy 2002; Khamfula and Tesfayohannes 2004; Maruping 2005; 
Rossouw 2006a; Rossouw 2006b and Jefferis 2007). A critical point that is highlighted in 
the above-mentioned studies is that macroeconomic convergence is clearly a requisite for 
monetary union. Furthermore, it is believed that a SADC monetary union is a possibility. 
However, McCarthy (2002:26) believes that SADC is not ready for this step in regional 
integration and he suggests that given the current conditions in Southern Africa, 
macroeconomic stability is preferable to macroeconomic convergence and monetary 
integration. The limited empirical research, as well as the conflicting views of the studies 
at hand that relate to macroeconomic convergence and the viability of the formation of a 
SADC monetary union call for further research on this issue. Such a study should 
ascertain the extent of macroeconomic convergence that exists amongst the SADC and, 
subsequently determine whether the formation of a regional monetary union is currently 
feasible.   
  
1.2. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
 
The primary objective of this research is to determine the extent of macroeconomic 
convergence amongst the countries that form SADC so as to analyse the viability of the 
proposed initiative to form a regional monetary union amongst the SADC countries. The 
secondary goal is to propose useful policy suggestions relating to the development of 
regional monetary integration between SADC members.  
 
In terms of methodology, the extent of macroeconomic convergence is to be determined 
by analysing whether the countries that constitute SADC have similar monetary policy 
transmission processes. Thus, an examination of whether the pass-through of monetary 
policy has become more similar over time is necessary. This will be achieved through the 
estimation of an interest rate pass-through model. The interest rate pass-through model 
 
 
4 
was primarily chosen as the empirical method to be used in this study owing to data 
limitations regarding the majority of the variables that constitute the SADC convergence 
criteria.  
 
1.3. ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY 
 
This study consists of five chapters. Chapter Two provides a review of the existing 
theoretical and empirical literature on the issues relating to macroeconomic convergence 
and the formation of a monetary union. Chapter Three describes the data used in the 
study as well as provides an outline of the analytical framework (interest rate pass-
through model) that is used for the empirical analysis. Chapter Four presents the results 
of the estimation of the interest rate pass-through model. Finally, Chapter Five provides a 
summary of the findings, discusses policy implications and suggestions, highlights the 
limitations of this study and gives proposals for future research.   
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORY AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
______________________________________________________________________ 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter outlines the conceptual definition of economic integration so as to put the 
notion of economic integration and convergence into perspective. Hence, the different 
forms of official economic integration arrangements are discussed and this is then 
narrowed down to the ultimate goals of both the AU and SADC. Moreover, the 
theoretical costs and benefits that relate to the formation of a monetary union are 
considered, as it is necessary that the net benefits outweigh the costs of monetary union if 
the integration initiative is to be worthwhile. In addition, the convergence criteria for 
economic and monetary union are compared and discussed in terms of both the 
international experience, relating to the Maastricht Criteria, as well as the SADC criteria 
that have already been set by the CCBG. The issues on meeting these criteria are also 
briefly analysed. In addition to the convergence criteria, a discussion regarding interest 
rate pass-through is included. Finally, a review of existing empirical literature relating to 
both African and SADC monetary union issues is conducted.   
 
2.2. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN CONTEXT 
 
2.2.1. Conceptual Definition of Economic Integration 
Balassa (1987:43) defined economic integration both as a “process and as a state of 
affairs”. If considered as a process, economic integration encompasses the set of political 
and economic measures “designed to eliminate discrimination between economic units 
that belong to different national states” (Balassa 1987:43). Moreover, if interpreted as a 
state of affairs, “it represents the absence of various forms of discrimination between 
national economies” (Balassa, 1987:43). Hence, from this definition it becomes evident 
that economic integration can be viewed as the path that is followed to decreasing levels 
of economic discrimination among countries.   
 
In addition to the simple conceptual definition of economic integration it is necessary to 
explore the different forms of official economic integration arrangements that exist. 
These different forms entail various degrees of discrimination between partner countries 
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and also between themselves and third parties. Moreover, in summary, these different 
degrees of integration involve some sacrifice by the individual countries of a proportion 
of their autonomy in economic policy making as all of them abolish discrimination 
among their members (Cardoso and Ferreira, 2000:403). The most common forms of 
economic integration arrangements that are referred to in the literature are discussed 
below: 
 
Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs): 
According to Arguello (2000:4), these are arrangements through which member nations 
receive reductions on tariffs or preferential treatment with regard to quantitative 
restrictions on their levels of trade with other member countries while upholding their 
normal level of trade restrictions against third parties. Generally, these types of 
agreements apply only to a group of products and are unilaterally granted. 
 
Free Trade Areas (FTAs): 
Under a FTA member countries eliminate trade barriers amongst themselves, however, 
they maintain their individual national trade barriers against third parties. Normally, strict 
rules of origin as well as expensive customs inspection are a necessary condition to 
prevent trade deflection (Arguello, 2000:5). In addition, Appleyard and Field (2001:351) 
note that the FTA is the most common integration scheme. 
 
Customs Unions (CUs): 
Member countries remove all barriers to trade among themselves and adopt a common 
set of tariffs that is to be applied to third parties. Consequently, under such an 
arrangement the adoption of both intra-CU rules of origin and the need for customs 
inspection become obsolete (Arguello, 2000:5). Furthermore, the group that consists of 
the customs union acts as one body in the negotiations of all trade agreements that are 
conducted with non-member countries (Appleyard and Field, 2001:352). 
  
Common Markets (CMs): 
The common market will comprise of all characteristics that define a customs union, 
however, it also allows for the full mobility of factors of production. However, member 
countries will define common policies that will regulate factor flows with third parties. 
According to Appleyard and Field (2001:352), the free movement of labour and capital 
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between member countries represents a higher level of economic integration, however, at 
the same time a further reduction in the national autonomy of the individual economies is 
relinquished. Arguello (2000:5) believes that the need for domestic policy harmonisation 
is more compelling in a common market as compared to the case of a customs union. 
However, it should be noted that there is no formal obligation for member countries to 
move in this direction.  
 
Economic Unions (EUs): 
Arguello (2000:5) and Appleyard and Field (2001:352) describe an economic union as 
the most comprehensive form of economic integration. Although an economic union 
comprises the characteristics of a customs union, an economic union implies the 
complete harmonisation of monetary, fiscal, industrial, and welfare policies as well as the 
establishment of a common pattern of foreign relations. Furthermore, Appleyard and 
Field (2001:352) note that when an economic union adopts a common currency, it 
becomes a monetary union.   
 
In terms of the above forms of economic integration, four of the SADC countries namely: 
Lesotho, South Africa, Swaziland and Namibia form the CMA and thus, operate under a 
fixed exchange rate system with the South African Rand as anchor currency. In addition, 
Botswana and the four CMA countries form the SACU, which has an independent 
exchange rate system but is indirectly linked to the Rand through a currency basket 
(Aziakpono et al., 2007:5). Hence, it is clear that some of the SADC countries have 
already begun to form economic links in terms of the above-mentioned forms of 
economic integration arrangements.    
 
In addition to the above-mentioned types of economic integration arrangements, Jefferis 
(2007:85-86) identifies four main ‘stylised’ stages of monetary integration. It is necessary 
to have an understanding of these stages of integration considering that it is SADC’s 
primary goal to achieve full economic cooperation that includes a free trade area as well 
as the move toward the establishment of a monetary union by 2016 and a single currency 
by 2018. Moreover, Maruping (2005:133) highlights that one of the envisaged goals of 
the AU is to formulate a monetary union for the entire continent that encompasses having 
a common currency and central bank by 2025. The stylised stages can be characterised 
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principally by the nature of exchange rate policy, which in turn has direct implications for 
monetary policy as well as a host of other policies.  
The stages are discussed below. 
Stage 1 – There is no monetary integration and there is no attempt to link or co-ordinate 
the monetary policies of the different countries. However, national monetary policies 
may move together if the countries experience similar economic structures and/or 
experience similar external shocks. In addition, exchange rates would be freely floating 
and countries will posses national monetary policy autonomy (Jefferis, 2007:86). 
Stage 2 – There is weak monetary integration whereby exchange rates are linked by 
means such as where a managed float constrains exchange rates within a predetermined 
range or alternatively through a system of a crawling peg arrangement. Jefferis (2007:86) 
notes that such exchange rate linkages may restrict the independence of national 
monetary policies, however, the extent of this restriction will be dependant upon the 
extent of capital mobility. Therefore, if capital controls are maintained then a certain 
degree of monetary autonomy will remain.  
Stage 3 – There is strong monetary integration whereby the exchange rates of national 
currencies are pegged to each other (either with allowances for adjustments or, more 
strongly, with a binding peg). If there is full capital mobility, which has been made 
possible by the existence of no capital controls and well developed national capital 
markets, a common monetary policy may be pursued for all countries that are party to the 
arrangement. Jefferis (2007:86) warns that if monetary policy is not co-ordinated 
effectively at this stage then the consequent result will be unsustainable capital flows that 
would inevitably make the exchange rate peg impossible to maintain1
Stage 4 – There is full monetary union (the aim of SADC), whereby this is the result of 
the culmination of the process of monetary integration. In such a monetary union all 
member states are to make an irrevocable commitment to the monetary union as well as 
adopt a single common currency
.   
 
2
                                                 
1 According to Jefferis (2007:86), the inconsistency of a monetary policy target and an exchange rate target 
coupled with capital mobility is frequently referred to as ‘the impossible trinity’. 
2 This single common currency may be an existing currency or a completely new one.  
 and a single central bank will be solely responsible for 
the management of monetary policy. The implication of this is that individual member 
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states have no autonomous monetary or exchange rate policy with regard to other 
member states of the union, although they do (collectively) vis-à-vis non-members 
(Jefferis, 2007:87).    
 
The remaining sections of the chapter will focus on the concepts of both economic 
convergence and monetary union, as these initiatives are the goals of both SADC as well 
as the African Union. 
 
2.3. COSTS AND BENEFITS ARISING FROM MONETARY UNION 
Glick (1991:1) clearly expresses that the formation of a monetary union will entail both 
costs and benefits for member countries and therefore, it is important that these are 
reviewed and understood as they have implications for either the success or failure of a 
monetary union.   
The following section draws heavily on literature from various authors (cf. Glick, 1991; 
Kaufmann, 1996; Afxentiou, 2000; Hawkins and Masson, 2003; Tethalova, 2004; 
Maruping, 2005; Saville et al., 2005; Tavlas, 2007; Jefferis, 2007) who have undertaken 
studies that relate to the experience of the formation of the European Monetary Union in 
terms of the costs and benefits that result as individual countries abandon their own 
monetary unit in favour of a common unit as the formation of a monetary union occurs.  
2.3.1. Potential Benefits of a Monetary Union 
Various economic benefits have been identified that can result from the formation of a 
monetary union. Afxentiou (2000) and Jefferis (2007) identify the following benefits of 
monetary union: (1) the reduction in transactions costs, (2) elimination of the risk of 
exchange rate volatility across members, (3) reduced costs of financial services arising 
from the large size of available pools of financial assets (benefits relating to the 
exploitation of economies of scale), and (4) providing an ‘agency of restraint’ that will 
serve to reduce the ability of governments to pursue irresponsible and destabilising 
macroeconomic policies. Maruping (2005:136) notes that the resultant benefits of 
macroeconomic convergence and ultimately monetary union are conferred upon members 
both individually as well as collectively through achieving a more stable macroeconomic 
outlook via more sustainable fiscal deficits and public indebtedness, external current 
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account deficits, as well as low and stable levels of inflation, which are among the key 
pre-conditions for achieving strong and sustainable economic growth.  
i. Reduction in transactions costs 
This is the most obvious benefit of a monetary union recognised by authors such as 
Kauffmann (1996), Agbeyegbe (2003), Tethalova (2004), Maruping (2005) and Jefferis 
(2007). According to Tethalova (2004:19), the introduction of a common currency has 
the ability to significantly reduce or even remove transactions costs associated with 
trading goods and services between the countries of the monetary union with different 
monies. Furthermore, companies will be faced with lower costs as a result of the common 
currency as a result of not having to fulfil the task of multi-currency bookkeeping. In 
addition, further positive effects may stem from holding fewer foreign currency reserves 
as well as from the fact that there will be a smaller number of goods prices owing to the 
existence of the single currency in the region that represents the monetary union. Thus, 
from these reduced transactions costs, higher output and consumption gains may be 
realised, thereby, improving welfare. More specifically, Kaufmann (1996:3) states that 
the reduced direct and indirect transactions costs will “add permanently possibly 1-2 
percent to GDP of the member states.” Hence, it is evident that this is a significant 
potential benefit that could positively contribute to the economies of the member states of 
the proposed monetary union. 
ii. Elimination of the risk of exchange rate volatility across members 
According to Afxentiou (2000:251), the absence of convertibility of one currency into 
another is beneficial, particularly for small transactions as well as for tourism. However, 
the benefit of zero exchange rate volatility tends to be downplayed in today’s globalised 
financial economy as a result of the extent to which integrated financial markets and 
foreign exchange hedging practices already exist so as to provide people with protection 
from currency fluctuations and uncertainty (Afxentiou, 2000:251). In addition, Tavlas 
(2007:6) stresses that a reduction in exchange rate volatility will have the effect of 
increasing cross-border trade and investment, hence, improved economic growth may be 
apparent.  
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iii. Benefits relating to the exploitation of economies of scale 
In terms of the benefits relating to the exploitation of economies of scale, Tavlas (2007:7) 
indicates that these are essentially derived from the move toward monetary integration. 
This is achieved through mechanisms such as the enlargement of the foreign exchange 
market. This decreases both the volatility of prices and the ability of speculators to 
influence prices within the market and thus, to disrupt the conduct of monetary policy. 
The elimination of the need for reserves so as to conduct intra-area transactions and 
improved allocational efficiency of financing to the extent that both borrowers and 
lenders are provided with a broader spectrum of financial instruments which will also 
allow borrowers, lenders and equity investors to make more efficient investment choices 
in terms of duration and risk (Tavlas, 2007:8).    
iv. Providing an ‘agency of restraint’ 
The benefit in relation to the provision of an ‘agency of restraint’ is potentially important 
as well as relevant for certain SADC countries that have a history of reckless public 
finances and general macroeconomic mismanagement. The reason for this is that it is 
potentially a means of achieving central bank independence as macroeconomic policy 
will be delegated to a supernatural monetary authority (Jefferis, 2007:90). In addition, 
although the quality of macroeconomic policymaking within the SADC region has 
improved in recent years, a well-designed and functional monetary union could help 
reinforce these gains through centralised and more stringent policy formulation and 
implementation. Jefferis (2007:90) also believes that a further dimension of the agency of 
restraint argument is that monetary union will prevent exchange rate adjustments from 
being utilised as a ‘quick fix’ to achieve improvements, which are essentially superficial. 
The resulting benefit is that economic efforts will rather be focussed on long-term 
fundamentals, which will enhance economies of scale as well as efficiency.  
Furthermore, Buigut (2006:301) suggests that a benefit of fixing a national currency to a 
low inflation currency is essentially the enhanced anti-inflationary credibility of national 
monetary policies. However, this benefit is more likely to be achieved through the 
formation of a supranational monetary authority acting as an agency of restraint as this 
will tend to reduce the degree of monetary mismanagement that is prevalent in most 
African countries. Hawkins and Masson (2003:5) are of the opinion that sovereign states 
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tend to forgo an independent currency by handing over the control of monetary policy to 
a regional or foreign central bank. This is perceived as an indirect way of attaining the 
benefits that accompany central bank independence3
Moreover, according to Maruping (2005:131), the process of monetary integration can be 
plagued by both perceived or real losses and gains among member countries and this may 
result in disputes as well as a sense of loss of national sovereignty. Hence, successful 
integration will require strong and loyal commitment in terms of implementing the agreed 
arrangements as well as fair mechanisms that will allow for the arbitration of disputes and 
the equitable distribution of the costs and benefits of the integration arrangement. 
Moreover, the balance of benefits is heavily dependent upon the structure of the 
economies involved in the union. For example, the extent of potential savings from lower 
transactions costs and reduced exchange rate uncertainty is dependent upon the extent of 
trade amongst members of the monetary union (Maruping, 2005:131). The major costs of 
. 
From the basis of monetary policy moving out of control of the sovereign state and rather 
being centrally coordinated, the governments of members of a monetary union effectively 
become committed to a monetary rule. Hence, sovereign political discretion over 
monetary policy is removed (Saville et al. 2005:684). Evidence has shown that this 
essentially results in lower country risk premiums, reduced exchange rate risk, lower 
price inflation, lower real interest rates and higher rates of economic growth (cf. 
Kaufmann, 1996; Fink and Salvatore, 1999). 
2.3.2. Costs of a Monetary Union 
While the gains that accrue to the member nations and the citizens of member nations are 
welcomed, it seems to be clear that every benefit has a corresponding cost. Hence, it is 
important to determine whether the net benefits justify the formation of a monetary 
union. Saville et al. (2005:684) suggest that despite the costs of monetary union, the 
evidence suggests that, on balance, countries that agree to join a monetary union tend to 
enjoy net economic benefits. However, because of the fact that unionisation is a multi-
lateral arrangement, each country needs to consider the feasibility of entry into a 
monetary union.  
                                                 
3 A lack of central bank independence is believed to be a primary reason for the poor performance of 
monetary policies in emerging economies (Hawkins and Masson, 2003:5).  
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a loss of monetary and fiscal policy as a stabilising tool and the loss of revenues from 
seignorage are discussed below.  
i. The loss of monetary and fiscal policy as a stabilising tool 
According to Tethalova (2004:18), the primary cost of receiving the host of economic 
benefits of monetary union arises at the macro level. This is essentially because while 
foregoing floating exchange rates, individual members of the monetary union need to 
realise that they will have to forgo the possibility of dampening business cycle 
fluctuations through the use of country specific counter-cyclical monetary policy, such as 
the use of the exchange rate as a tool of macroeconomic stabilisation. This arises as the 
monetary union will be under the influence of the common monetary policy as 
implemented by the single central bank of the monetary union. However, the monetary 
union will naturally retain control of the exchange rate changes as an instrument in its 
dealings with the rest of the world. 
In addition, Glick (1991:2) emphasises that the cost of losing monetary policy as a 
stabilising tool is least when macroeconomic disturbances affect all members of the union 
at the same time and in the same manner. This situation is most likely to occur when 
there is a high degree of macroeconomic convergence and integration amongst the union 
countries. However, if union members are subject to idiosyncratic or asymmetric shocks, 
this could exacerbate the problems or losses that may result from foregoing national 
control over monetary, exchange rate and fiscal policies (Jefferis, 2007:91). 
Furthermore, according to Jefferis (2007:88), the Optimum Currency Area (OCA) 
literature poses arguments that within a monetary union, members should be granted 
additional flexibility with regard to fiscal policy so as to compensate for the loss of 
autonomy in terms of policy instruments (monetary and exchange rate policies) so as to 
be able to respond to economic shocks. However, it is stressed that this argument is not 
widely accepted based on two main reasons. Firstly, the problem of public debt 
sustainability will tend to arise as a result of using fiscal expansion to compensate for 
negative shocks. Secondly, a budget deficit in one union member may result in negative 
externalities for other members if additional borrowing and recourse to capital markets to 
fund the deficit induces union-wide interest rates to increase (Jefferis, 2007:88). Hence, 
this is clearly a potential problem in any monetary union that is characterised by 
centralised monetary policy decision-making that is decentralised.  
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Jefferis (2007:88) suggests that such concerns resulted in the implementation of limits on 
budget deficits under the EMU, which essentially aim to constrain the use of fiscal policy 
as a mechanism of stabilisation by the EMU member states. Hence, in such a situation 
none of the three main levers of macroeconomic policy, namely, monetary, exchange rate 
and fiscal policy is fully available to individual national governments within a monetary 
union. Therefore, this gives rise to an adjustment problem relating to the issue of how to 
effectively respond to economic shocks, specifically asymmetric shocks across monetary 
union members. However, Jefferis (2007:88) emphasizes that common shocks can be 
resolved by union-wide monetary and exchange rate adjustments. 
ii. The loss of revenues from seignorage 
Afxentiou (2000:250) highlights that granting monetary control to a single central bank 
will deprive each member of revenues from seignorage. However, Afxentiou (2000:250) 
believes that the loss of seignorage will mainly affect the countries of the union that are 
plagued with high inflation rates. Naturally, these countries will tend to be those nations 
who print money so as to finance their budget deficits instead of borrowing money in the 
financial markets. Hence, the specific criteria that must be satisfied prior to the formation 
of economic and monetary union that relate to the inflation rates of possible members is 
an important indicator as to whether the country in question will benefit from joining the 
monetary union.    
 
2.4. CONVERGENCE CRITERIA FOR ECONOMIC AND MONETARY UNION 
 
2.4.1. Introduction 
The dominance of the Maastricht criteria, which formed the basis of the largely 
successful EMU, has had the implication that other convergence criteria specific to 
certain regions such as SADC have been influenced by the Maastricht criteria. Thus, the 
macroeconomic convergence criteria of SADC tend to bear a resemblance to those that 
were instituted under the Maastricht Treaty. However, when setting macroeconomic 
convergence criteria, specific regional differences are taken into account. The Maastricht 
criteria and the SADC convergence criteria are discussed in more detail below.   
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2.4.2. Maastricht Criteria 
According to Springer (1996:281), the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in late 1993 
paved the way for the most complicated as well as controversial treaty in the history of 
European integration. The treaty contains several provisions that are relevant to monetary 
union, both in the body as well as in the attached protocols. However, what is important 
is that the Maastricht Treaty contains the convergence criteria that guide the commission 
and the European Monetary Institute (EMI) in selecting which countries are eligible to 
become members of the EMU. 
 
 However, Afxentiou (2000:248) notes that, strictly speaking, the Maastricht criteria have 
had little to do with convergence and goes on to define convergence as “a process which 
unifies technological and non-rival domains, preparing institutionally and structurally 
laggard countries to catch up with those at the forefront’’. Hence, Afxentiou (2000:248) 
believes that the Maastricht criteria are basically rules that have been set out so as to 
ensure price and fiscal stability. Moreover, if the rules are to be effective in terms of 
ensuring monetary and fiscal stability then the Maastricht criteria must operate within an 
environment that is characterised by economic homogeneity and not by internal or 
external economic disparities. Thus, an environment of this nature will satisfy the key 
conditions for an optimal currency area (Afxentiou, 2000:248).   
 
Polasek and Amplatz (2003:4) simplify the description of the Maastricht Treaty by 
describing it as merely containing important macroeconomic requirements in order to 
become a member of and participant in the EMU while Afxentiou (2000:249) highlights 
the five conditions or criteria by which a country is admitted to the union. These 
conditions are outlined below. 
 An inflation rate no more than 1.5 percentage points above the average of the three 
countries with the lowest inflation rates; 
1. Nominal long-term interest rates not exceeding 2 percentage points of those of the 
three countries with the lowest inflation rates; 
2. No exchange rate realignment for at least two years; 
3. A government budget deficit not in excess of 3 percent of each country’s GDP; 
and 
4. A gross debt to GDP ratio that does not exceed 60 percent. 
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Afxentiou (2000:249) notes that the first three convergence criteria are intended to ensure 
monetary stability by ensuring a fixed exchange rate regime among member countries. In 
contrast, the last two criteria are designed to reinforce the stability of the Euro, thus, 
protecting the European Union from threats of inflation, which may be a result of 
government budget deficits. Springer (1996:283) stresses that the criteria listed above are 
not an infallible guide to which member states will participate in the monetary union and 
that the criteria may be strictly observed or may merely serve as an indicator. Thus, a 
country in which the trends are moving in the right direction could be declared ready for 
membership to the union.  
 
Although the criteria mentioned above appear to be sound and economically prudent, 
Springer (1996:283) notes that the Maastricht convergence criteria have been attacked by 
critics on a number of grounds. The most notable weakness of the criteria stems from the 
fact that if governments adopt the severe policies that are needed in order to meet the 
criteria then economic development could be hampered. For example, Springer 
(1996:283) suggests that anti-inflationary policies necessary for convergence can result in 
declining investments when interest rates are used to curb spending. Furthermore, slower 
modernisation of the economy, less competitiveness, and increased unemployment are 
likely outcomes as a result of increasing interest rates so as to control inflation.     
 
2.4.3. SADC Convergence Criteria 
According to Rossouw (2006b:156), SADC has already undergone the process of setting 
macroeconomic convergence criteria that will steer the region toward monetary 
unification and a single central bank. Masson and Pattillo (2005:114) note that the 
convergence criteria that have been agreed upon for SADC serve as a set of indicators 
that will allow monitoring of progress towards economic convergence of the region. 
Moreover, Rossouw (2006a:383) highlights that the goals of macroeconomic 
convergence in SADC are aligned with the ultimate goal of the economic integration of 
Africa. 
 
According to Rossouw (2006b:157), convergence goals and criteria have been set for 
2008, 2012, 2015 and 2018, with more challenging goals set for later periods (See Table 
2.1 below). These convergence criteria and goals are set out in a memorandum of 
17 
 
understanding, agreed to by the Ministers of finance of countries in the SADC region. 
The initial criteria set for 2008 are the following: 
 
1. SADC countries should have single-digit inflation rates; 
2. A budget deficit of less than 5 percent of GDP; 
3. The nominal value of public and publicly guaranteed debt, as a ratio of GDP, 
should not exceed 60 percent; 
4. Foreign reserves should be equal to three months imports; and  
5. Central bank credit to the government should not exceed 10 percent of the 
previous years tax income (Rossouw, 2006b:157). 
 
Moreover, according to Gaolathe (2004:5), co-operation aimed at achieving effective 
macroeconomic convergence in SADC as well as regional integration is enhanced by the 
harmonisation of both legal and operational frameworks of the SADC central banks, the 
SADC payment, clearance and settlement systems, as well as the co-ordination of 
training of central bank officials. The CCBG of the SADC has been given the 
responsibility of monitoring the progression of macroeconomic convergence within the 
region. This is an essential role as satisfactory progress is vital if the goal of a monetary 
union and a single central bank within SADC is to be achieved by 2016 (Rossouw, 
2006a:382). 
 
In addition to the criteria outlined above, Maruping (2005:141) notes that SADC has set 
the following milestones for tracking progress in harmonisation and convergence 
processes among its member nations: elimination of exchange controls by 2005; 
establishments of a free trade area by 2006; establishment of a customs union by 2010; 
establishment of a common market by 2012; and establishment of a monetary union by 
2016. Hence, it is clear that these criteria pose intricate challenges upon the monetary 
policies and activities of the SADC countries respective central banks.  
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Table 2.1: Macroeconomic Convergence Criteria and Goals for SADC   
Criterion 2008 2012 2015 2018 
Inflation 
Rate 
Single digits 5% 5% 3% 
Budget 
Deficit 
5% or less of 
GDP 
3% of GDP as 
anchor, with a 
range of 1% 
3% of GDP as 
anchor, with a 
range of 1% 
3% of GDP as 
anchor, with a 
range of 1% 
Government 
Debt 
Less than 60% 
of GDP 
Less than 60% of 
GDP 
Less than 60% of 
GDP 
Less than 60% of 
GDP 
Foreign 
Reserves 
3 months 
import cover 
More than 6 
months import 
cover 
More than 6 
months import 
cover 
More than 6 
months import 
cover 
Central bank 
Credit to the 
Government 
Less than 10% 
of the previous 
years tax 
income 
Less than 10% of 
the previous 
years tax income 
Less than 5% of 
the previous 
years tax income 
Less than 5% of 
the previous years 
tax income 
Notes: Government Debt is defined as Government’s domestic and foreign debt and debt guaranteed by 
government.  
Source: Adapted from Rossouw (2006b:157).  
2.4.4. Assessment of Macroeconomic Convergence in SADC 
Table 2.2 highlights the achievement of convergence criteria set for 2008 by each of the 
SADC countries included in this study based on 2004 data.  
Table 2.2 Achievement by 2004 of Macroeconomic Convergence goals set for 2008   
Country Inflation 
Rate (Single 
Digits) 
Budget 
Deficit 
(<5% of 
GDP) 
Government 
Debt (<60% of 
GDP) 
Foreign 
Reserves 
(3Months 
Imports) 
Central Bank Credit to 
Govt. (<10% of Tax 
Income) 
Botswana 7.80 -0.2 5.00 17.0 0.00 
Lesotho 5.10 -5.2 53.7 5.7 5.90 
Malawi 11.5 -6.4 163.9 2.3 60.0 
Mozambique 9.10 ** ** 5.4 0.00 
Namibia  3.90 -1.6 35.1 ** 0.00 
South Africa 1.40 -1.9 36.0 5.0 5.30 
Swaziland 3.40 -3.6 24.1 2.0 5.30 
Tanzania 4.10 -3.3 88.9 8.0 10.4 
Zambia 18.0 -1.7 ** 1.3 36.1 
Notes: ** Figures not available.  
Source: Adapted from Rossouw, (2006b:158). 
In respect of inflation, Table 2.2 shows that only two countries had not achieved the 2008 
goal of single digits by 2004. These countries are Malawi and Zambia. The SADC 
countries showed the greatest degree of convergence in terms of the goal relating to 
containing budget deficits, however, the methods for calculating such figures should be 
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considered. It is evident that there is divergence rather than convergence between the 
government debt figures for those countries that had the necessary data available. This is 
clear as the figure ranged from 5.0 per cent in Botswana to 163.9 per cent in Malawi as 
shown in Table 2.2. With respect to foreign reserves, it is apparent that not all countries 
had achieved the goal of maintaining 3 months import cover, however, significant 
progress has been made in Botswana and Tanzania in this regard. By 2004 central bank 
credit to the government as a percentage of the previous year’s tax income ranged 
between zero (Botswana, Mozambique and Namibia) and 60 per cent in Malawi which 
thus, indicates that the achievement of this goal may still take some time. 
 
In summary, the review of theoretical literature highlights that there are potential benefits 
that are to be gained through the process of moving toward monetary unification. 
However, it is clearly recognised that the process of forming a monetary union should 
only be pursued if the net benefits outweigh the costs. Moreover, it is clear that the 
macroeconomic convergence criteria that have already been set by SADC bear a 
resemblance to those that were instituted under the Maastricht Treaty in late 1993. 
However, although the Maastricht criteria were successful in aiding the movement 
toward European Monetary Union it must be stressed that the economic conditions found 
in the SADC countries are vastly different to those found in Europe. Hence, the 
Maastricht criteria may be used as a guideline, but the SADC criteria must remain 
focused on the current situations faced in the SADC countries that aim to form a 
monetary union. However, the fact that the SADC criteria are of a similar nature to those 
of the Maastricht Treaty provides evidence that the CCBG has considered monetary 
unification efforts in other regions so as to learn from their experiences.     
 
2.5. REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
 
Various economists have attempted to empirically model the formation of a monetary 
union (cf. Bayoumi and Ostry, 1998; McCarthy, 2002; Matsaseng and Viegi, 2003; 
Polasek and Amplatz, 2003; Grandes, 2003; Agbeyegbe, 2003; Khamfula and Huizinga, 
2004; Yehoue, 2005; Kabundi and Loots, 2005; Maruping, 2005; Buigut, 2006; Karras, 
2006; Buigut and Valev, 2006; Jefferis, 2007; Aziakpono et al., 2007). However, 
according to Agbeyegbe (2003:1), only a few papers discuss issues relating to monetary 
integration in SADC (cf. Agbeyegbe, 2003 and Aziakpono et al., 2007). Despite this, 
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lessons may be learnt and comparisons may be made from previous studies relating to the 
formation of monetary unions in general. However, it should be noted that the majority of 
studies that relate to monetary integration are of a theoretical and comparative static 
nature4
                                                 
4 See for example, Khamfula and Tesfayohannes (2004), Maruping (2005), McCarthy (2005), Rossouw 
(2006a) and Jefferis (2007) etc. 
, and hence, there is the need to continue to add to the relatively small amount of 
empirical literature relating to monetary integration in sub-Saharan Africa.  
The rest of this section will review various empirical studies that have been conducted on 
the SADC as well as Africa in terms of economic and monetary integration and the main 
findings and empirical results are presented and analysed. The studies will firstly be 
considered in terms of the empirical methodology used and then the empirical findings 
will be discussed and compared. Moreover, a discussion that considers the convergence 
of pass-through from money market (or central bank rates) to lending rates in some of the 
EMU countries will be conducted. This is necessary as it has become clear that the major 
reason for the lack of thorough empirical work regarding convergence within the SADC 
region is due to the lack of available data that is consistent and comparable between all 
the countries within the region. 
According to Tavlas (2007:9), all studies differ in terms of the empirical methodologies, 
countries considered, dependent and conditioning variables (in regression studies), as 
well as the particular sample periods used. Hence, the results of the studies are not strictly 
comparable. Thus, in an attempt to help distinguish between the findings and make useful 
comparisons, the studies relating to SADC that are discussed are grouped into five broad 
methodological approaches: (1) studies that deal with correlations of real growth rates; 
(2) studies that consider correlations of shocks; (3) studies that consider correlations of 
exchange rates or of terms of trade; (4) studies utilising price-based measures, and (5) 
studies utilising pass-through as a measure of convergence. However, for the purposes of 
this study, in the cases where authors have considered countries in other regions of Africa 
(apart from studies relating to pass-through as a measure of convergence), the discussion 
will be focussed on the results that relate to monetary union in southern Africa.  
 
2.5.1. Correlations of Output Growth Rates 
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According to Tavlas (2007:10), empirical studies that detail correlations of real per 
capita growth rates aim to present information that relate to the subsequent underlying 
shocks because apart from the impact of trends, disturbances in output are primarily 
driven by shocks. Hence, cyclical movements in output are resultant of specific shocks.  
In this field, Bayoumi and Ostry (1998) attempted to measure the size and correlation of 
underlying economic disturbances as well as intraregional trade across sub-Saharan 
Africa. The authors calculated bilateral correlations of growth rates for 11 southern 
African economies for the period 1963-1989 by regressing the growth of real output per 
capita (measured as the change in the logarithm of real per capita GDP) upon it own first 
and second lags. The residuals from this regression were then taken to represent the 
underlying real output disturbances. Although no attempt was made to identify the source 
of these disturbances, the size of these underlying disturbances were calculated using the 
standard deviation of the residuals and then the correlations of these disturbances was 
assessed. Correlations across the 11 southern African countries revealed that 5 of the 55 
correlations were positive and significant, although, the results tend to make little 
geographical sense. However, the most salient feature of the findings was the lack of 
significant correlations between South Africa and its neighbouring countries (which form 
part of the CMA). Hence, it is clear that the findings of the study indicate that there is 
minimal evidence that the sub-Saharan African countries would benefit in the near future 
from the formation of larger currency unions.     
In a similar light, Karras (2006) calculated correlations of detrended output growth for 37 
African countries (of which 10 were SADC countries5
                                                 
5 Dem. Rep. Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozambique, Mauritius, Malawi, Tanzania, South Africa, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
) using real GDP based on 
purchasing-power-parity (PPP) over the periods 1960-2000 and 1980-2000. Karras 
(2006) essentially used three different methods to detrend the output series of each 
country and estimate its cyclical component. The three methods were (1) first 
differencing, (2) the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter proposed by Hodrick and Prescott 
(1980), and (3) the Band-pass filter proposed by Baxter and King (1995). However, 
unlike Bayoumi and Ostry (1998) who aimed to calculate bilateral output correlations 
among country pairs, Karras (2006) estimated correlations of each country’s cyclical 
output against the SADC total. The results revealed that three of the eight sets of 
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correlations were above 0.40 (those for Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe), thus, 
indicating that these three countries represent an optimal currency area with South Africa.  
Although the above studies provide some insight into monetary unification in southern 
Africa, Tavlas (2007:10) highlights that the approaches followed by both Bayoumi and 
Ostry (1998) and Karras (2007) are limited in the sense that the authors do not explicitly 
distinguish between disturbances to output growth and the policy responses to these 
disturbances. In addition, Bayoumi and Ostry (1998) made no attempt to determine 
whether the source of the disturbances were related to factors such as domestic economic 
policies, external shocks, political instability and/or civil unrest.     
In addition, Kabundi and Loots (2005:9) conducted a study making use of a dynamic 
factor model to investigate the impact of increasing trade on the co-movement of the 
business cycle between South Africa and the SADC countries. The real growth rate 
(represented by annual real GDP data) was used to analyse the co-movement between the 
South African business cycle and the rest of SADC covering the period 1980-2002. It 
should be noted that Tanzania was not included in the study owing to data restrictions. 
 According to Kabundi and Loots (2005:6), in the generalised dynamic factor model each 
time series is assumed to be composed of two unobserved components: the common 
components, which are driven by a small number of common shocks to the entire panel, 
and idiosyncratic components, which are specific to a particular variable and orthogonal 
with the common components. The specific notion behind this common component 
analysis is that only a small number of random variables determine the co-movement of 
the business cycles in question.  
The empirical results of the study revealed that the strongest correlation for the entire 
period exists between South Africa and Mozambique, followed by weaker correlations 
between South Africa and Angola, Zambia, Lesotho, Mauritius and Swaziland. However, 
Kabundi and Loots (2005:14) found that with the rest of the SADC economies, no co-
movement exists. The authors attributed this finding to the fact that the correlation 
analysis is constrained by the absence of more frequent data. Amongst the countries that 
form SACU, there is strong evidence of co-movement from the early 1990’s onwards. 
Finally, strong co-movement is evident between South Africa and Zimbabwe until 1998 
owing to the strong trade relations that once exited between the countries. The study thus, 
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identified three factors as possible sources of synchronisation of business cycles within 
the SADC region, namely intra-regional trade, the European Union as a major trading 
partner and the world business cycle. Finally, although co-movement in the region was 
shown to exist, Kabundi and Loots (2005:22) believe it was weaker than expected and is 
mainly driven by outside forces such as trade with the European Union.    
 
2.5.2. Correlations of Output Shocks 
Yehoue (2005) made use of an econometric method to extract the underlying 
disturbances from real output for 53 African countries (including all 14 SADC countries) 
for the period 1980-2000. It should be noted that Yehoue (2005) estimated autoregressive 
equations for levels of real GDP. The author utilised a three-step autoregressive 
estimation procedure. The three steps in the procedure were as follows: (1) the growth of 
per capita GDP was regressed upon its own first and second lagged values, (2) the 
underlying disturbances were calculated using the regression residuals, and (3) the 
correlations of the disturbances among the respective countries were obtained. 
 
 In a similar vain to Karras (2007), Yehoue (2005) estimated correlations or co-
movements of shocks for each of the SADC countries against the SADC as a whole. 
From the findings it was revealed that all of the co-movements were positive and 
significant and hence, his findings were generally supportive of the possibility of forming 
a monetary union in the SADC region. However, the path to a common currency would 
be gradual in nature. Moreover, it should be noted that the results of the study made no 
attempt to account for the non-stationarity that is believed to be typically present in 
output data expressed in levels. Hence, the results may reflect specification errors that 
will result from the presence of non-stationarity.  
 
In an attempt to identify separate supply and demand shocks and evaluate the potential 
for forming monetary unions in 21 Eastern and southern Africa countries, Buigut and 
Valev (2006) made use of a two-step structural vector autoregression (VAR) model. For 
most of these countries, the data covered the sample period from 1971-2002. However, 
where data was limited the sample period was reduced to the period 1980-2002. Real 
GDP growth was used to measure the changes in output, while the changes in the implicit 
GDP deflator represent price changes. For each country, the first difference of the natural 
log of real GDP and the implicit GDP deflator were used for estimation. It should be 
24 
 
noted that the data for Zimbabwe was found to be unstable and, hence, this country was 
not included in this study.     
 
The study also aimed to identify and compare macroeconomic shocks to the various 
countries considered in the study with a focus of the shocks to aggregate output growth 
and inflation. More specifically, to recover the underlying shocks, the VAR identification 
scheme developed by Blanchard and Quah (1989) and Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) 
was utilised. This identification scheme is based on the aggregate demand-aggregate 
supply (AD-AS) framework. Within this model the supply side and demand side shocks 
can be recovered for all prospective members of the monetary union from the estimation 
of a finite order VAR. The optimal lag length to be used in the model is chosen in such a 
way that the residuals approximate white noise. If the correlations from the estimations 
are positive then they are considered as symmetric and if negative, the correlations are 
regarded as asymmetric. Naturally, the more symmetric the shocks, the more feasible it 
becomes for a group of countries to form a monetary union. The results of the supply 
shocks showed that South Africa has significant correlations in the supply shocks it faces 
with those faced by its neighboring states of Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique. 
However, based on the correlations and geographical proximity that were revealed in the 
study, Buigut and Valev (2006) tentatively suggest a tripolar route to monetary union 
with the first region comprising that of the southern cone of Africa, consisting of the 
existing CMA, expanding northwards to include Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia. 
Finally, considering the question of an external anchor-currency, the authors find no 
evidence to support linking a Southern African (SADC) currency to any of the hard 
currencies.    
 
A further study by Buigut (2006) extends to the study conducted by Buigut and Valev 
(2006) by utilising the methodology of decomposing shocks using a VAR model while 
incorporating cluster analysis to the model. Cluster analysis essentially encompasses a 
number of diverse algorithms and methods for grouping objects into respective categories 
based on a set of measurements in such a way that the degree of association between 
members of a cluster is strong and weak between members of a different cluster. Hence, 
this study by Buigut (2006) utilises a number of these algorithms to group Eastern and 
Southern African countries into monetary clusters using a set of variables motivated by 
Optimal Currency Area (OCA) theory and nominal convergence criteria. Hence, each 
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cluster of countries that is generated describes, in terms of the variables used, the country 
groupings which would be most suitable for monetary union.  
 
The study used the correlations of shocks derived from the Blanchard-Quah methodology 
(as in the Buigut and Valev (2006) study discussed previously) while also considering 
each region’s specific features by analysing three separate scenarios. These scenarios are 
outlined as follows: (1) the countries are grouped without making reference to an anchor 
economy; (2) South Africa assumes the role of the anchor economy (as is currently the 
case in the CMA) and (3) the euro is assigned the role of the anchor currency as in the 
CFA zone. The respective variables that are used in the cluster analysis include trade 
integration among the economies concerned, debt-service ratios, public debt ratios, tax 
revenue ratios, and inflation rates. The results of the study conclude that there is support 
for a monetary union in southern Africa, under the assumption that the South African 
Rand was the anchor currency for a small group of countries consisting of Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. Under scenarios (2) and (3) described 
above, Buigut (2006) found that a group of four countries was suitable for a monetary 
union, namely; Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland.  
 
2.5.3. Correlations of Exchange Rates or Terms of Trade 
Under this grouping of studies, Jefferis (2007) calculated correlations of exchange rates, 
inflation rates and interest rates of 12 SADC countries (Madagascar and Zimbabwe were 
excluded from the analysis) over two sub periods ranging from 1990-1996 and 1997-
2002. More specifically, the coefficients of bilateral exchange rates against the South 
African Rand as well as interest rate and inflation rate differentials in relation to South 
Africa were used as the variables in the study. Jefferis (2007:96) highlights that there is 
no particular reason for choosing these sub periods although many countries did 
experience extensive economic reform programmes during these periods. In the analysis 
it was assumed that South Africa would be the key member of any regional monetary 
union. The indicators that were used in the study were chosen because they are of specific 
relevance to monetary union. Hence, Jefferis (2007:96) notes that prior to monetary 
union, exchange rates must have been relatively stable for several years and no 
significant divergences in inflation and interest rates between potential monetary union 
members. The findings from the study revealed that eight countries comprise what 
Jefferis (2007) termed a ‘convergence group’; these being Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius, 
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Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania and South Africa. It should be noted, 
however, that Tavlas (2007:18) believes that although Jefferis (2007) was able to infer 
from his results that an eight member convergence group is viable, Jefferis (2007) did not 
provide any formal analysis of the sets of data used in the study and it also appeared that 
the convergence group was casually based upon the inspection of the data.   
 
An earlier study by Grandes (2003) made use of a more complex statistical procedure 
than Jefferis (2007). The author made use of a two-step econometric model that was 
based on the theory of generalized purchasing power parity (G-PPP). The purpose of this 
was twofold; (1) to determine whether the CMA has been close to forming an OCA, and 
(2) to determine what the costs and benefits are for the member countries that belong to 
the CMA. In the first step of the procedure the null hypothesis of bilateral real exchange 
rates (RER) was tested so as to determine whether there exists a long run relationship 
between the RER in the CMA countries. This was done so as to determine whether the 
CMA members form an OCA. In the second step a panel data model was developed with 
the aim of determining which cost and which benefit factors have empirically influenced 
the need of different RER adjustments, i.e. a deviation from G-PPP (for instance when 
external shocks occur). The sample period of the study spans from the year 1990 to 2001 
and monthly data was used. The author provides two reasons for the choice of period, i.e. 
(1) it was the time when Namibia became independent, though it formally joined the 
CMA in 1992, and (2) a new political era began in South Africa after the end of the 
apartheid regime. Essentially, Grandes (2003) tested for cointegration among bilateral 
exchange rates using the South African Rand as the base currency for the four CMA 
countries and Botswana. If the relationships from the cointegration tests were found to be 
stationary it was inferred that the real exchange rate exhibited common trends. The 
econometric evidence from the study suggest that the CMA and Botswana do indeed 
form an OCA given the existence of the common long-run trends in their bilateral 
exchange rates. Hence, the findings of Grandes (2003) are similar to those found by 
Buigut (2006). Finally, Grandes (2006) also highlights that there are further 
microeconomic efficiency gains that can still be accrued if the countries considered in the 
study continue forward and develop a fully-fledged monetary union.        
A study conducted by Agbeyegbe (2003) investigates the feasibility of a monetary union 
in SADC by examining evidence of nominal exchange rate and inflation convergence. 
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The study applies the methodology of time varying (Kalman Filter) analysis to study nine 
non-CMA member countries of SADC, and based on the analysis determines whether the 
member countries point towards a direction of being able to join a new single currency 
system. The empirical analysis focuses on two variables (inflation and exchange rate) 
partly because these variables have received most attention in previous studies and partly 
because of data availability. The methodology adopted in the study follows Hall, 
Robertson and Wickens (HRW) (1992) who in their study of measuring convergence of 
European Community countries, clarified the concept of convergence and in doing so 
introduced an approach based on time varying parameter analysis to establish economic 
convergence. The data used by Agbeyegbe (2003) to test for exchange rate convergence 
was monthly data for the period spanning 1992:2 – 2000:11. Using the South African 
Rand as the anchor currency the empirical results suggest differing (non)convergence 
among the non-CMA countries to the South African Rand. For all but one country, the 
results show that there is no evidence of movement towards the Rand rate, the exception 
being Malawi’s Kwacha. Turning to inflation convergence, the monthly data covered the 
period 1980:2 - 2000:07. The results of the tests based on the augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) and the Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock (ERS) optimality test do not provide 
evidence in support of non-stationarity for both the individual inflation rates and the 
differential rates between each non-CMA country and the averages of the CMA 
countries. Hence, the results reveal that inflation rates in the non-CMA countries do not 
converge to the average of the CMA countries. Thus, this non-convergence of the 
nominal exchange rate and the consumer price inflation rate suggest that the chances of 
SADC member countries satisfying some form of Maastricht-type criteria in forming a 
monetary union is relatively low.      
 
Finally, a study by Khamfula and Huizinga (2004) aimed to investigate whether a 
monetary union is desirable among the countries of the SADC community. A Generalised 
Auto-Regressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model was employed to 
consider the share of the variation in real exchange rates (RER’s) vis-à-vis South Africa 
that can be explained by the divergence in monetary and fiscal policies. The data for the 
study runs from 1980-1996 and the data for RER are constructed using monthly 
seasonally adjusted exchange rates and inflation rates. Owing to the scarcity of data, 
Angola, Mozambique, Seychelles and the Democratic Republic of Congo were excluded 
from the study. The econometric procedure followed by the authors included three steps; 
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(1) after calculating bilateral exchange rates against the South African Rand, each 
bilateral rate was seasonally adjusted with the use of dummies. The authors calculated 
two sets of residuals, one for the monthly data and one for the quarterly data, (2) each of 
the residuals were regressed upon their own lags so as to generate estimates of 
unanticipated residuals, (3) the squares of these unanticipated residuals were used as 
measures of underlying shocks. It should also be noted that the monthly residuals were 
characterised as the short-run case and the quarterly residuals were representative of the 
long-run case.  
 
The results of both the short-run and long-run cases suggest that the conditional variances 
of the RER disturbances between South Africa and most other SADC countries are 
comparable and, hence, the following countries would be suitable to form a monetary 
union; South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Swaziland and 
Zimbabwe. That said, it should be noted that the results revealed low degrees of 
symmetry of RER shocks across most of the economies considered. This clearly indicates 
that the costs of forming a monetary union would generally be higher than the relative 
benefits. Thus, in terms of policy perspectives Khamfula and Huizinga (2004:713) warn 
that SADC as a whole should not form a monetary union in the near future, as the 
countries are too different to form an optimal currency area. Furthermore, Kamfula and 
Huizinga (2004:710) believe that the evidence from the study reveals that a serious 
obstacle to regional integration in southern Africa appears to be the dominant position of 
South Africa. 
 
2.5.4. Studies Using Price-Based Measures  
Aziakpono et al. (2007) investigate the state, development, and drivers of banking market 
integration in the member countries of the SADC by employing interest rate data. In an 
attempt to investigate the monetary and banking market integration in SADC, the 
methods of principal component analysis (PCA) and interest rate pass-through were 
applied to central bank interest rates as well as to deposit and loan interest rates. 
According to Aziakpono et al. (2007:3) it was more appropriate to analyse co-movements 
of interest rates by PCA as it is possible to also identify groups of countries for which 
interest rates move in the same direction. Thus, from this stance if central bank rates 
move together and monetary policy rates are transmitted to retail rates in a uniform 
manner in the various countries under study, then the banking market appears to be 
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integrated (Aziakpono et al., 2007:3). The results of the study confirmed the authors’ 
expectations that the CMA banking markets are most integrated followed by the SACU 
countries. There was also evidence in the study that suggests that the level of integration 
increases over time for each region and interest rate. The study also subjected the entire 
SADC region to further analysis focusing on the period between 2000-2005 where there 
is evidence of growing integration with the aim of sorting the countries into groups that 
are becoming integrated based on similarities of their movements. Hence, the countries 
that are converging to the CMA countries become the focus so as to determine whether 
an expanded CMA is viable, which will consequently shed light on the prospect for a 
SADC-wide monetary union. There is evidence that some countries are converging with 
the CMA toward the end of the sample period. From the evidence found in the analysis 
Aziakpono et al. (2007:29) propose that a selective, yet cautionary expansion of the 
CMA is possible. More specifically, Seychelles, Zambia and Botswana are potential first 
candidates. Despite this, Aziakpono et al. (2007:29) warn that such an expansion requires 
not only more policy coordination and nominal convergence but financial market 
imperfections need to be addressed as well.    
 
2.5.5. Studies Using Pass-Through as a Measure of Convergence: 
Toolsema et al. (2002) examines whether the pass-through of monetary policy measures 
in six EMU countries6
                                                 
6 The six EMU countries considered in the study include: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, and Spain.  
 have become more similar over time, i.e. whether or not there is 
convergence in monetary transmission. This is an important issue as it has been argued 
that asymmetries in monetary transmission across the countries in the euro area may 
seriously hamper the common monetary policy of the ECB (cf. Dornbusch et al., 1998). 
The sample period of the study is 1980-2000. Toolsema et al. (2002) note that the 
difficulty in conducting such research is finding interest rates that are comparable across 
countries. In terms of methodology, firstly, the long-run relationship between money 
market lending rates is estimated using the Fully Modified ordinary Least Squares (FM-
OLS) estimator and test parameter for instability following Hansen (1992). As these tests 
indicate that certain changes have occurred over time, an Error Correction Model (ECM) 
is then applied with a moving window in which the number of observations remains the 
same. For each regression that is conducted, one observation at the beginning of the 
window is dropped and one is added at the end of the window. The findings of the study 
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show that differences in pass-through exist in the sample considered, both in terms of 
initial as well as long-run responses to policy-induced interest rate changes. Despite this, 
there is some (weak) evidence for convergence of monetary policy transmission.       
 
2.6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
From a theoretical point of view the most common forms of economic integration were 
placed in context and it became clear that amongst the SADC countries (particularly the 
CMA and SACU countries) there has already been significant progress in economic 
integration agreements. Moreover, various authors (c.f. Glick, 1991; Kaufmann, 1996; 
Afxentiou, 2000; Hawkins and Masson, 2003; Tethalova, 2004; Maruping, 2005; Saville 
et al. 2005; Tavlas, 2007; Jefferis, 2007) have highlighted and conducted studies that 
refer to the importance of the costs and benefits that are associated with the formation of 
a monetary union. The consensus from these studies is that an effort to form a monetary 
union should only be undertaken if the net benefits of such an economic commitment are 
positive.  
 
The macroeconomic convergence criteria that provide guidelines in determining which 
countries are eligible for membership of the monetary union of both the Maastricht 
Treaty and the SADC were discussed and it is evident that the SADC convergence 
criteria appear to be similar to those that were implemented under the Maastricht Treaty. 
Despite this, a major challenge of further empirical studies relating to macroeconomic 
convergence in SADC is that there is a considerable lack of consistent data that allows 
for comparisons between countries. 
 
From a review of the empirical literature the results of the studies remain mixed, which 
provides the need for further studies relating to macroeconomic convergence and the 
formation of a monetary union within SADC. Although the studies that were reviewed 
provide some insight into monetary unification in southern Africa, many of the 
approaches used in the studies are limited in terms of methodological approaches as well 
as data constraints which limited the number of southern African countries that could be 
included in the studies (c.f. Bayoumi and Ostry, 1998; Khamfula and Huizinga, 2004; 
Karras, 2006). Moreover, there had been little use of the interest rate pass-through 
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methodology as a means to measure macroeconomic convergence in SADC and hence, 
this thesis aims to fill this gap in the literature.  
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It would be recalled that the primary objectives of this study as stated in Chapter 1 is to 
determine the extent of macroeconomic convergence amongst the countries that form the 
SADC so as to analyse the viability of the proposed initiative to form a regional monetary 
union amongst the SADC countries. 
 
This chapter outlines the analytical framework that is used in order to provide empirical 
evidence to the objectives of the study. In addition, the specific variables and data used in 
the study will be explained. The chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 discusses 
issues relating to the data used in the study as well as considering some of the data 
limitations that influenced the methodology and empirical model used. Section 3.3 
explains the empirical pass-through model and the econometric procedure, and finally 
Section 3.5 concludes the chapter. 
 
3.2. DATA 
 
A major difficulty of a study involving developing African countries is the lack of 
sufficient data that is comparable across countries. For the countries that were analysed, it 
was a formidable challenge to find such data. It was not possible to find consistent and 
comparable time series data for the variables that form the SADC convergence criteria 
(inflation rate, budget deficit, government debt, foreign reserves and central bank credit 
to the government) and this may be the reason for the lack of empirical studies that relate 
directly to such variables within SADC. Moreover, according to Allen and Ndikumana 
(2000:139), macroeconomic time series for developing countries such as those of the 
SADC are generally sparse and when available they are usually recorded annually, which 
limits the number of observations to include in a study. In addition, Allen and Ndikumana 
(2000:139) note that conducting a study on a region such as SADC presents particular 
difficulties in that the availability of consistent country specific data is usually only 
available after the respective countries became independent nations, which dates back to 
the mid-1960’s up until 1990 for Namibia. To effectively test whether or not there is 
evidence of macroeconomic convergence it would be beneficial to have a reasonably long 
time series as well as a uniform set of data across the countries under analysis.    
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Owing to such data limitations and the need to use uniform data that is comparable across 
the countries this study uses interest rate data. These were obtained from International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) International Financial Statistics CD ROM May 2008. The interest 
rates series used are: the Bank rate (CBR) and the lending rate (LR). The Bank rate is the 
rate at which central banks lend or discount eligible paper for depository institutions (line 
60 of the IMF IFS) and the lending rate represents the prime lending rate of the major 
commercial banks (line 60p). The regression sample includes only ten countries7
ttt CBRLR εαα ++= 10
 for 
which consistent and comparable data was available.  
 
The estimation period runs from January 1990 to December 2007 and the analysis makes 
use of a rolling sample period of six years (72 observations). Therefore, the analysis 
considered 13 rolling samples from January 1990 to December 1995, January 1991 to 
December 1996 and so on until January 2002 to December 2007. Toolsema et al. 
(2002:9) suggest that the idea behind the rolling window approach is to generate results 
that should indicate whether monetary transmission has converged over time in the 
country under consideration. Moreover, according to Aziakpono and Wilson (2008:20), 
the rolling window analysis is useful as it allows us to trace the dynamic development of 
the interest rate pass-through over time.  
 
3.3. EMPIRICAL PASS-THROUGH MODEL 
 
 According to Sander and Kleimeir (2006:2), a widely used methodology to investigate 
the effectiveness of the monetary transmission process is interest rate pass-through 
estimation as it is able to determine how fast and how complete changes in monetary 
policy rates are passed onto bank lending rates. However, it is crucial to note that the 
speed and completeness of such interest rate pass-through depends upon variables such as 
the banking market structure as well as potential information asymmetries.     
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
The pass-through methodology used in this study is closely based on Aziakpono and 
Wilson (2008). Thus, the primary model representing the relationship between the central 
bank rate and the lending rate for the countries under analysis is specified as follows:    
                         ..........................................(1) 
                                                 
7 The countries included are: Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania and Zambia. 
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where CBRt represents the exogenously determined central bank rate and LRt represents 
the endogenously determined commercial bank retail rate, which is a lending rate; tε  is 
the stochastic error term; while 0α and 1α  are the intercept and slope parameters 
respectively. The a priori expectation is that 0 ≤ 1α  ≤ 1. According to Aziakpono et al. 
(2007:13) and Sorensen and Werner (2006:21), if 1α  = 1 this implies full or perfect (one-
to-one) pass-through of the central bank rate to the lending rate in the long-run. However, 
issues such as switching costs, information asymmetries, credit demand functions that are 
not fully elastic, imperfect competition and other financial market imperfections can 
cause imperfect or limited pass-through which will be represented by 1α <1 (Aziakpono 
et al., 2007:13). On the other hand, if 1α >1 this implies a form of over-shooting and this 
can be an indication that banks are not rationing the supply of credit but are rather 
increasing lending rates so as to compensate for higher risks and this may be due to credit 
risk factors that are reflective of information asymmetries between banks and their 
respective borrowers (Aziakpono et al., 2007:13).  
 
3.3.1. Econometric Procedure 
The econometric procedure to be followed when estimating Equation 1 depends upon the 
time series properties of the data. Hence, it is necessary to determine whether the interest 
rates are either stationary or non-stationary at levels and whether or not they are 
cointegrated8
If the interest rate series are found to be stationary at levels then Equation 1 is estimated 
using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). However, if the unit root tests reveal that the series 
. Thus, the natural starting point of the analysis is to conduct unit root tests. 
The reason behind this is that it is well known that a regression analysis using non-
stationary variables is vulnerable to produce spurious results and, thus, standard 
asymptotic econometric theory used for regression analysis cannot be applied (Hamori 
and Tokihisa, 1997:245). There are various methods that can be used to test for the 
stationarity of time-series data (cf. Dickey and Fuller 1981; Said and Dickey 1984; 
Phillips and Perron 1988; and Kwiatkowski et al., 1992). This study uses the Dickey-
Fuller Generalised Least Squares (DF-GLS) test and the Phillips-Perron (PP) test to test 
for unit root. 
 
                                                 
8 The underlying idea behind cointegration is that non-stationary time series (such as interest rates) can 
move apart in the short-run, but will return to an equilibrium relation in the long-run (Toolsema et al., 
2002:9). 
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are not stationary at levels, but stationary at first difference, then cointegration tests will 
be conducted in order to determine whether or not the CBR and the LR of the respective 
country are cointegrated. If the stationary series of the CBR and the LR are found not to 
be cointegrated, then Equation 1 will be estimated with first difference series so as to 
avoid the problem of spurious regression. Thus, Equation 2 will be estimated in such an 
instance: 
   
                    titt CBRLR εδδ +∆+=∆ 10 ……………………………….(2) 
 
where ∆  represents the first difference of either the CBR or the LR, while 0δ and 
1δ represent the short-run intercept and slope coefficients respectively. The slope 
coefficient, 1δ , will be interpreted as the short-run pass-through for the respective 
country.  
 
If the CBR and the LR are found to be cointegrated, then an error correction model 
(ECM) as in Aziakpono and Wilson (2008) will be estimated to determine the extent of 
the pass-through as well as how long it will take for the LR to adjust to changes in the 
CBR. The specification of the ECM follows in Section 3.3.2.   
 
Before the details of the ECM are discussed it is necessary to briefly outline the tests that 
are conducted in order to determine whether or not the CBR and the LR are cointegrated. 
Following Aziakpono and Wilson, (2008) four types of tests are conducted to provide 
robust evidence of whether or not LR and CBR are cointegrated, namely: (1) the 
Johansen maximum likelihood approach, (2) the cointegrating regression Durbin-Watson 
(CRDW) test, (3) the Engle-Granger (EG) approach, and (4) the error-correction based 
test. Cointegration is considered to exist if at least two of the above test statistics are 
significant at the 10% level or one test statistic at the 5% level of significance and 
secondly, following Kremers, Ericsson and Dolado (1992), cointegration is considered to 
exist when the coefficient of the lagged error correction term (ECTt-1) is significant at the 
5% level.  
 
Kremers et al. (1992:341) illustrate how a statistic based upon the estimation of an error-
correction model can be approximately normally distributed when no cointegration is 
present, despite the fact that the equivalent Dickey-Fuller statistic has non-normal 
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asymptotic distribution. Thus, with cointegration, the ECM statistic is able to generate 
more powerful tests than those based upon the Dickey-Fuller statistic that is applied to 
the residuals of a static cointegrating relationship. Hence, in this study cointegration is 
considered to exist if the coefficient of the lagged error correction term is significant at 
the 5% level even if the other tests indicate that cointegration does not exist. This 
decision is based purely on the premise that the error correction based test has proved to 
be more powerful (Kremers et al., 1992).   
 
3.3.2. The Error Correction Model 
If cointegration between the CBR and the LR is found from the tests mentioned above, an 
ECM of the relationship between these two interest rates would be estimated to examine 
the short-run dynamics. The ECM to be estimated is represented by Equation 3 and has 
the following form: 
 
             ttittt ECCBRLRLR εσβδδ ++∆+∆+=∆ −− 11110 ……………………(3) 
 
where ∆ represents the first difference of the respective interest rate, tε is the white noise 
error term and σ is the coefficient of the error correction term, which subsequently 
measures the degree of adjustment to equilibrium. According to Aziakpono and Wilson 
(2008:25) a coefficient of the 1−tEC  that is statistically significant suggests that market 
forces are in operation to restore long-run equilibrium following a short-run disturbance. 
1β  is the short-run pass-through and 1δ is the coefficient of the lagged dependent 
variable, i.e. the lending rate.  
 
From Equation 3 above following Aziakpono and Wilson (2008), the mean adjustment 
lag (ML) is computed as follows: 
 
                    σβ /)1( 1−=ML ……………………………….……………(4) 
 
Equation 4 above represents the mean adjustment lag, which is a measure of the degree of 
rigidity for the symmetric error correction model. According to Aziakpono and Wilson 
(2008:25) high rigidity is indicated by a ML that is high and this consequently indicates a 
slow adjustment of the LR to policy-induced changes in the CBR. Similarly, if the ML is 
low then the adjustment of the LR to policy induced changes in the CBR are much 
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quicker and thus, there is a lower degree of rigidity in the symmetric error correction 
model. Hence, the ML is essentially a measure of the speed of adjustment to which the 
LR will respond to changes in the CBR.  
 
The short-run and long-run pass-through parameters as well as the mean adjustment lags 
for the 13 rolling sample will be graphically plotted in order to examine whether or not 
the pass-through from policy induced changes in the CBR to the LR has become more 
similar over time, i.e. whether there is convergence in monetary transmission among the 
SADC countries. If it is evident that convergence has occurred, then the formation of a 
monetary union becomes more feasible.  
 
3.4. CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter outlines the empirical method that is used in this study. The econometric 
procedure described in Section 3.4 will be used in an attempt to determine the extent of 
macroeconomic convergence within SADC through analysing whether the degree of 
interest rate pass-through has become more similar over time for the countries included in 
the study. The results of the estimation procedure are presented in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION  
 
This chapter presents the results of the empirical pass-through model described in 
Chapter 3. Firstly, a preliminary analysis of the data is undertaken and the descriptive 
statistics and correlations between the CBR and the LR are presented in Section 4.2. 
Section 4.3 provides a summary of the results of the unit root tests while Section 4.4 
presents the findings from the cointegration analysis. Section 4.5 and Section 4.6 
provides a discussion of the results of the pass-through model for SADC as well as 
SACU and the CMA. Finally, Section 4.7 concludes and a summary of the interest rate 
pass-through analysis is provided in Table 4.3A of the chapter Appendix.      
 
4.2. PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS 
 
Table 4.1 reports the banking market concentration for the 10 SADC countries included 
in the analysis. This table is compiled to gain insight into the degree of banking sector 
competition as this has an effect upon interest-rate pass-through. 
Table 4.1. Bank Concentration               
YEAR BOTS LES MAD MAL MOZ NAM SA SWA TAN ZAM 
1990 * * * * * * 1 * * * 
1991 1 * * * * * 0.88 * * * 
1992 1 * * * * 1 0.74 * * 1 
1993 0.97 * * * * 1 0.75 * * 0.85 
1994 0.97 * 1 * * 1 0.77 * * 0.93 
1995 0.97 1 1 * * 1 0.76 * * 0.86 
1996 0.97 * * 0.99 0.95 0.83 0.76 * 1 0.82 
1997 0.98 * * 0.96 0.90 0.82 0.74 1 0.81 0.93 
1998 1 * 1 1 0.97 0.82 0.73 * 0.72 0.68 
1999 1 * 0.85 0.92 0.91 0.78 0.72 1 0.72 0.69 
2000 0.98 1 0.81 0.86 0.90 0.80 0.71 0.92 0.72 0.66 
2001 0.97 1 0.83 0.86 0.89 0.83 0.74 0.91 0.70 0.62 
2002 0.95 1 0.81 0.86 0.85 0.91 0.74 0.80 0.68 0.61 
2003 0.84 1 0.81 0.86 0.80 0.86 0.76 0.76 0.58 0.58 
2004 0.77 1 0.94 0.92 1 0.93 0.76 1 0.62 0.64 
Notes: * represents years for where no data is available 
 
Source: Adapted from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2000) and updated by authors in 2006 
 
Bank concentration represented in Table 4.1 is calculated as the assets of the three largest 
banks as a share of assets of all commercial banks of the respective countries. A bank 
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concentration index close to 1 indicates a country with a high bank concentration and 
thus, competition within the banking sector will be relatively low. Moreover, a low bank 
concentration index indicates a less concentrated banking sector and therefore, a higher 
degree of banking sector competition. From Table 4.1 it is clear that the degree of bank 
concentration is relatively high in the majority of the countries, however, the 2004 figures 
indicate that bank concentration is highest in Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland, 
Madagascar and Namibia while Tanzania and Zambia have the lowest bank concentration 
followed by South Africa and Botswana.   
 
Table 4.2 below reports the country-specific descriptive statistics that relate to the central 
bank rates and lending rates of the countries included in the study. 
Table 4.2:Descriptive Statistics             
Bank Rates 
  BOTS LES MAD MAL MOZ NAM SA SWA TAN ZAM 
Mean 13.4 15.4 14.0 31.6 20.9 13.2 13.1 11.9 18.6 34.0 
Median  14.0 15.5 12.0 27.0 9.95 12.8 13.0 12.0 14.6 27.9 
Maximum 15.3 22.0 33.0 75.3 69.7 21.3 21.9 18.0 67.5 123.0 
Minimum 6.50 10.8 7.00 11.0 9.95 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.82 6.46 
Std. Dev.  1.77 2.37 6.26 13.3 20.0 4.11 3.66 2.92 10.8 24.2 
Lending Rates 
  BOTS LES MAD MAL MOZ NAM SA SWA TAN ZAM 
Mean 14.5 16.5 28.3 37.5 22.0 16.5 16.4 15.0 23.7 44.9 
Median  14.8 17.0 26.5 33.0 20.5 16.7 16.3 14.5 22.0 41.1 
Maximum 16.8 25.0 45.0 65.0 33.5 24.8 25.5 21.0 48.0 139.3 
Minimum 7.50 11.5 24.2 20.0 16.5 10.5 10.5 10.5 12.8 18.3 
Std. Dev.  2.03 2.87 4.90 12.3 3.42 3.79 3.60 2.77 9.11 21.9 
Source: Estimates by author. 
 
Although the descriptive statistics are in essence self-explanatory, from a visual 
inspection it is evident that when considering SADC as a whole, there seems to be 
similarities in the reported figures amongst the SACU countries (Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland) as well as similarities for other SADC countries 
(Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia). For example, the mean and 
standard deviation of both the central bank rates and the lending rates of the SACU 
countries are well below those of the non-SACU member countries. For example, the 
mean bank rate for South Africa is 13.05% while the mean bank rate for Zambia is 
33.97%. Similarly, the mean lending rate for South Africa is 16.36% while the mean 
lending rate for Zambia is 44.87%. Hence, this provides some insight into the degree of 
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homogeneity as well as convergence that may be evident in terms of the pass-through 
analysis. Thus, it is likely that the results for the countries that form the SACU and the 
CMA will be different to those of the non-member countries. Hence, it is expected that 
differing degrees of interest rate pass-through over the estimation period may be found 
for these groups of countries. However, this will become clearer from the interpretation 
of the respective pass-through results. 
 
Table 4.3 below provides the correlation between the CBR with the LR in level series for 
the 10 SADC countries that were analysed in the study. 
 
Table 4.3: Central Bank Rate versus Lending Rate Correlations  
CBR versus LR (Level Series)   Correlations   
Botswana  0.948  
Lesotho  0.794  
Madagascar  0.537  
Malawi  0.963  
Mozambique  0.503  
Namibia  0.968  
South Africa  0.994  
Swaziland  0.997  
Tanzania  0.708  
Zambia   0.726    
                     Source: Estimates by author. 
 
It is clear from Table 4.3 that the pairwise correlations between the central bank rates and 
the lending rates for the SACU countries tend to be significantly higher than those of the 
other countries that form the SADC, with the exception of Malawi. This may be due to 
these countries following South African monetary policy due to the CMA arrangement, 
and as a result the transmission of monetary policy may be similar in these countries. 
 
4.3. UNIT ROOT TESTS  
 
The detailed results for the unit root tests are reported in Table B1 in Appendix B. Tests 
were conducted for a unit root in both the CBR and the LR for each rolling window used 
in the analysis. Both the Dickey-Fuller Generalised Least Squares (DF-GLS) and the 
Phillips-Perron (PP) tests were conducted for both series in levels and in first differences. 
The results for the series in levels strongly suggest that null hypothesis (H0) of unit root 
cannot be rejected for the vast majority of the rolling windows and this is a first sign of 
the expected non-stationarity of the interest rates over the analysed period. However, 
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from the results of the hypothesis of a unit root in the first difference of both the CBR and 
the LR, it becomes clear that both tests strongly reject the null hypothesis (H0) of a unit 
root. This implies that the interest rates that are under consideration are I(1) variables.  
 
4.4. COINTEGRATION ANALYSIS 
 
Since both series of interest rates (CBR and LR) are found to be integrated of the same 
order, i.e. they are integrated of order I(1) as shown by the unit root tests, they can be 
tested to determine whether a stable long-run relationship exists between them. As 
mentioned in the previous Chapter, four types of cointegration tests were undertaken to 
determine if a long-run relationship exists between the CBR and the LR over the various 
rolling windows. The results of these tests are reported in Table C1 in Appendix C. As 
can be seen from the results of the respective cointegration tests, a long-run cointegrating 
relationship is found to exist for almost all of the rolling window periods under analysis 
for the ten SADC countries included in the study. Since the existence of a long-run 
relationship has been established between the CBR and the LR, the short-run dynamics of 
the pass-through model can be established within an error-correction model. However, an 
error-correction model cannot be estimated for the periods where cointegration is not 
present.   
 
4.5. RESULTS OF THE ROLLING REGRESSION MODEL 
      
The results for the regressions have been estimated for a sample period of 18 years from 
January 1990 to December 2007. More specifically rolling sample periods of six years 
(72 observations) were estimated to track the dynamic development of the interest rate 
pass-through over time. Summaries of the long-run and short-run rolling regression 
models are presented in Tables D1 and E1 respectively of the Appendix. Figures 4.1 – 4.9 
below report the results of the rolling regression estimation for the short-run pass-through 
( 1δ ), the long-run pass-through ( 1α ) and the mean adjustment lag (ML) for SADC, 
SACU and the OTHER countries.  
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4.5.1. Short-Run Pass-Through ( 1δ ): SADC, SACU and OTHER 
          Figure 4.1. Short-Run Pass-Through ( 1δ ): SADC 
 
 
Note: The breaks in the line graphs above are indicative of periods that there were either an insufficient 
number of data observations to estimate the model or the series were representative of a near singular 
matrix. This note also applies to Figures 4.2 and 4.3 below. 
 
Source: Computed based on data from the IMF International Financial Statistics CD-ROM. 
 
 
           Figure 4.2. Short-Run Pass-Through ( 1δ ): SACU 
 
 
 
Source: Computed based on data from the IMF International Financial Statistics CD-ROM. 
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                    Figure 4.3. Short-Run Pass-Through ( 1δ ): OTHER 
 
 
Source: Computed based on data from the IMF International Financial Statistics CD-ROM. 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the short-run pass-through ( 1δ ) measures the 
immediate adjustment of the lending rate to changes in the policy induced central bank 
rate. Figure 4.3 illustrates that for countries such as Madagascar and Tanzania, the short-
run pass-though has shown tendencies to be relatively stable over time. However, from 
Figure 4.1 it is clear that the short-run pass-through of Lesotho initially increased but 
then substantially decreased towards the levels of pass-through in Madagascar, Namibia, 
Tanzania and Zambia. The short-run pass-through in South Africa and Swaziland remain 
consistently above those in the other countries over the majority of the estimation period, 
while after the 2000-2005 rolling window the short-run pass through of Botswana and 
Malawi rise to levels similar to those of South Africa and Swaziland. Owing to limited 
data for Mozambique, the short-run pass-through was only estimated for five rolling 
windows and it is clear that the degree of pass-through remains well below those for all 
other countries.  
 
It should be reiterated that a short-run pass-through coefficient with a value of 1δ  that is 
significantly < 1 indicates that the interest rate adjustment process is sluggish, owing to 
factors such as interest rate stickiness. Hence, from Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 it is evident 
that interest rate adjustment in the short-run is sluggish in Lesotho, Madagascar, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania and Zambia particularly in the latter rolling windows 
post 1999. However, more favourable results with regard to immediate interest rate 
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adjustment are found in Botswana and Malawi from 2002 onwards. The short-run pass-
through for South Africa continuously improved from 1993 onwards to levels similar to 
those of Botswana and Swaziland in the final rolling windows. Finally, Swaziland tended 
to show a much quicker and more stable short-run pass-through over the entire estimation 
period in comparison to the other countries.  
 
4.5.2. Long-Run Pass-Through ( 1α ): SADC, SACU and OTHER 
Figure 4.4. Long-Run Pass-Through ( 1α ): SADC 
 
 
 
Source: Computed based on data from the IMF International Financial Statistics CD-ROM. 
 
Figure 4.5. Long-Run Pass-Through ( 1α ): SACU 
 
Source: Computed based on data from the IMF International Financial Statistics CD-ROM. 
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Figure 4.6. Long-Run Pass-Through ( 1α ): OTHER 
 
Source: Computed based on data from the IMF International Financial Statistics CD-ROM. 
 
Figure 4.4 above shows that there is evidence that the long-run pass-through in 
Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Zambia tend to move towards 
similar levels over the estimation period, particularly in the 2002-2007 rolling window. 
Therefore, this finding suggests that there is evidence of convergence of the long-run 
pass-through parameters in these countries. However, similarly to the short-run pass-
through represented in Section 4.5.1, this development becomes more visible from the 
start of the 1996-2001 rolling window for Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, 
Swaziland and Zambia. 
 
 The long-run pass-through for Lesotho falls to levels lower than those in the countries 
mentioned above from 1994-2000, as shown in Figures 4.4 and 4.5. Long-run pass-
through coefficients could not be estimated for Lesotho from 1998 onwards since there 
was no cointegrating relationship between the LR and the CBR. One possible explanation 
for the lower degree of long-run pass-through in Lesotho compared to the other SACU 
countries may stem from the degree of banking market concentration in the country. The 
figures from Table 4.1 clearly show that the banking market in Lesotho is highly 
concentrated9
                                                 
9 The bank concentration index is 1 for all years where data is available. 
 and, therefore, the level of competition in the banking sector is low. Thus, 
there is no pressure on the commercial banks to react quickly to policy-induced changes 
in the CBR. Thus, the monetary transmission process is likely to be slower and more 
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inefficient compared to a country where banking sector competition is rife. Hence, this is 
an example of interest rate stickiness. In addition Aziakpono et al. (2007:16) note that the 
financial system in Lesotho was in a state of distress from the mid-1990’s owing to poor 
management as well as political interference in the banking sector which resulted in 
reckless lending. This resulted in the liquidation of two of the largest banks10
The estimation results revealed that no country produced a long-run pass-through 
coefficient (
 in Lesotho, 
which further increased the concentration of the banking sector and reduced competition. 
Finally, a further insight as to why the long-run pass-through in Lesotho is considerably 
lower compared to the other SACU countries may be due to the degree of financial and 
monetary interdependence between Lesotho and South Africa. Aziakpono, (2008) 
conducted a study whereby the relationship between interest rates (including the LR) in 
Lesotho and the CBR in South Africa was analysed. The author examined the extent to 
which the money market in Lesotho is directly affected by the South African policy 
stance. The results revealed that Lesotho is dependent on the policy stance in South 
Africa more than its domestic monetary policy stance, and therefore, this may be a further 
explanation for the the relatively inefficient domestic monetary policy transmission in 
Lesotho (Aziakpono, 2008:207).  If this is the case, it would mean that Lesotho and the 
other SACU countries are converging in their monetary policy transmission.  
 
Although there is evidence of convergence of the long-run pass-through for Botswana, 
Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland and Zambia, there is a clear pattern of 
divergence for Madagascar and Tanzania whose long-run pass-through parameters fall to 
significantly low levels of 0.2 and 0.02 respectively for the final rolling windows that 
could be estimated for each country, as shown in Figure 4.6. These levels of pass-through 
are evidently well below those for countries that represent the convergence group. 
Moreover, these low values of the long-run pass-through are an indication of imperfect or 
limited interest rate pass-through as well as being a signal that market imperfections 
plague the economies of these countries. More specifically, it is likely that information 
asymmetries, switching costs, credit demand functions that are not fully elastic as well as 
other country specific financial market imperfections prevail in these countries. 
 
1α ) > 1 for the final rolling window that was able to be estimated for each 
respective country. Thus, there was no overshooting and therefore, there is no indication 
                                                 
10 Lesotho Agricultural Development Bank in 2000 and the Lesotho bank in 2001. 
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that banks are not rationing the supply of credit but are rather increasing lending rates so 
as to compensate for higher risks that are primarily due to credit risk factors that are 
reflective of information asymmetries between banks and their respective borrowers. 
However, there were periods where all the countries except for Madagascar, Namibia and 
Tanzania overshot, i.e. where ( 1α ) > 1, in previous rolling windows of the estimation 
period. 
 
 It is again, important to mention that if the value of a long-run pass-through coefficient 
( 1α ) = 1, this implies that full or perfect (one-to-one) pass-through of the policy induced 
central bank rate to the lending rate has occurred. From the results of the estimation a 
movement toward near perfect long-run pass-through can be observed for Botswana, 
Malawi, South Africa, Swaziland and Zambia. However, it should be recalled that the 
mean interest rates (CBR and LR) in Malawi and Zambia are very high compared to 
those in the SACU countries.   
 
 Thus, in sum the results reveal relatively similar degrees of pass-through for the SACU 
(with the exception of Lesotho) as well as for Zambia and Malawi. However, there is 
evidence of somewhat heterogeneous pass-through for the remaining countries under 
analysis. According to Sorensen and Werner (2006:25), an explanation for such 
heterogeneity between the degree of pass-through between countries are the differing 
degrees of competition in the banking sectors (as mentioned above) of each country, as 
well as country specific factors of the financial structures.  
 
4.5.3. Mean Adjustment Lag (ML): SADC, SACU and OTHER 
The question of how long it would take for full adjustment of the long-run interest rate 
pass-through to be attained is given by the mean adjustment lag. Thus, the mean 
adjustment lag indicates the exact time it takes for the transmission process in the long-
run to be completed, as well as showing whether the process is sluggish or fast 
(Aziakpono, 2006:15).  
 
Figures 4.7, 4.8 and 4.9 below illustrate the speed of transmission as measured by the 
mean adjustment lag (ML) of the LR to policy-induced changes in the CBR. The ML is 
calculated as stated in Equation (4) in Chapter 3. It should be noted that the speed of 
adjustment may only be estimated for rolling windows where a cointegrating relationship 
48 
 
between the LR and the CBR was found. This is because the error correction model 
(ECM) could not be estimated in cases where a cointegrating relationship is not found. 
Hence, this explains the reason for the breaks in the line graphs above for countries such 
as Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mozambique Swaziland and Tanzania, in some of 
the rolling windows.  
 
It is apparent that the ML tends to be relatively low and stable over the estimation period 
for Malawi, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland. However, a diverging speed of 
adjustment is noticeable for countries such as Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania and 
Zambia. It is interesting to note that although the results show that the long-run pass-
through in Zambia is high and tends towards those of the SACU countries, it takes a 
longer time for the pass-through to be accomplished. This is an indication of rigidity in 
the market owing to country specific market imperfections. The ML of Botswana 
increased to relatively high levels compared to the other SACU countries during the 
1994-1999 and the 1995-2000 rolling window, however, the ML decreased to levels 
similar to those of Malawi, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland from 2000 onwards. 
From the results of the computed ML it is evident that Botswana, Malawi, Swaziland and 
South Africa recorded the fastest LR adjustments with the transmission process being 
completed within a month of a change in the CBR. Thus, although there is a relatively 
strong degree of convergence over time in terms of the ML between the countries that 
form the SACU and Malawi, it is still evident that there remains a degree of variation 
amongst the other countries included in the analysis.   
 
Figure 4.7.Mean Adjustment Lag (ML) in the ECM model: SADC 
 
 
 
Source: Computed based on data from the IMF International Financial Statistics CD-ROM. 
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Figure 4.8.Mean Adjustment Lag (ML) in the ECM model: SACU 
 
 
Source: Computed based on data from the IMF International Financial Statistics CD-ROM 
 
Figure 4.9.Mean Adjustment Lag (ML) in the ECM model: OTHER 
 
 
Source: Computed based on data from the IMF International Financial Statistics CD-ROM. 
 
4.6. CONCLUSION 
 
From interpretation of the short-run pass-through ( 1δ ), the long-run pass-through ( 1α ), 
and the mean adjustment lag (ML) it is clear that there are countries that show tendencies 
of convergence over the estimation period in terms of the pass-through of monetary 
policy. A ‘convergence group’ consisting of Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South 
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Africa, Swaziland and, to some extent, Zambia has been identified. It is interesting to 
note that the values of the correlation coefficients presented in the correlation matrix 
between the CBR and the LR for the countries that form the ‘convergence group’ 
mentioned above are the six highest values and range from 0.948 – 0.997. Thus, although 
not all the SADC countries considered show similar degrees of pass-through over time, 
from the results that were generated it could be tentatively suggested that an initial group 
of countries consisting of Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland 
and Zambia could form an intermediate monetary union which will essentially be an 
expansion of the existing CMA. The results of this paper differ slightly from other studies 
(cf. Bayoumi and Ostry, 1998 and Kabundi and Loots, 2005), however, they are similar 
to those of Khamfula and Huizinga (2004) who used a GARCH model, and Aziakpono et 
al. (2007) who used Principal Component Analysis as well as interest rate pass-through 
to examine the feasibility of a southern African monetary union. Khamfula and Huizinga 
(2004) propose that it would be possible for Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa to form a monetary union, while Aziakpono et al. 
(2007) suggest that the CMA may be expanded to include Botswana, the Seychelles and 
Zambia. This study did not include Mauritius or the Seychelles owing to data limitations, 
however, similar results to Khamfula and Huizinga (2004) and Aziakpono et al. (2007) 
may have been found if data was available. Thus, based on the findings of these studies 
(the current one and those of Khamfula and Huizinga (2004) and Aziakpono et al. (2007), 
it is possible that the CMA could be expanded to include Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius 
and Seychelles.  
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.7. SUMMARY OF INTEREST RATE PASS-THROUGH ANALYSIS 
Table A 4.1: Summary of Inertest Rate Pass-Through Analysis                 
Country Rolling Sample Cointegration? Long-run PT Short-run PT ECM(s) ML 
  From To JJ EG CRDW Kremers Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat   
Botswana Jan-90 Dec-95 yes no yes yes 0.96 29.6 0.63 7.46 -0.27 -3.68 1.38 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 yes no yes yes 1.04 11.3 0.54 4.51 -0.22 -2.21 2.05 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 yes yes yes yes 0.45 7.56 0.42 4.78 -0.32 -4.02 1.78 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 yes no yes no 0.46 10.0 0.35 3.39    
 Jan-94 Dec-99 yes no yes yes 0.46 6.36 0.08 0.83 -0.17 -2.80 5.35 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 yes no yes yes 0.70 10.8 0.14 2.53 -0.16 -3.11 5.36 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 yes yes yes yes 0.95 26.6 0.24 4.67 -0.40 -5.58 1.89 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 yes yes yes yes 0.97 33.6 0.26 4.94 -0.42 -5.65 1.76 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 yes yes yes yes 0.97 33.9 0.31 5.74 -0.47 -5.92 1.47 
 Jan-99 Dec-04 yes yes yes yes 0.87 23.0 0.28 5.83 -0.36 -4.23 2.01 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 yes yes yes yes 0.76 18.5 0.28 6.00 -0.41 -4.64 1.78 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 yes yes yes yes 0.99 243.4 0.99 80.9 -0.87 -7.25 0.01 
  Jan-02 Dec-07 yes yes yes yes 0.99 200.9 0.97 73.6 -0.85 -7.21 0.04 
Lesotho Jan-90 Dec-95 yes yes yes yes 1.18 10.4 0.59 1.99 -0.34 -2.91 1.20 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 yes yes yes yes 1.12 12.3 0.95 3.22 -0.72 -4.24 0.06 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 yes yes yes yes 1.04 10.8 0.94 3.07 -0.75 -4.42 0.08 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 yes yes yes yes 1.10 16.6 0.99 6.41 -0.80 -5.12 0.01 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 yes no yes yes 0.95 18.0 0.75 8.08 -0.12 -1.35 2.09 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 yes no no yes 0.66 8.41 0.57 6.69 -0.12 -1.89 3.61 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 yes no no yes 0.57 8.22 0.56 6.58 -0.13 -2.10 3.25 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 yes no no yes 0.53 8.65 0.52 6.77 -0.12 -1.93 4.10 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 yes no no no 0.58 7.98 0.51 6.26    
 Jan-99 Dec-04 yes no no no 0.63 8.02 0.12 1.24    
 Jan-00 Dec-05 yes no no no 0.71 7.09 0.08 1.28    
 Jan-01 Dec-06 yes no no no 1.04 7.33 0.11 1.40    
  Jan-02 Dec-07 yes no no no 0.83 6.65 0.16 1.80       
Madagascar Jan-90 Dec-95 yes yes yes yes 0.49 27.2 0.31 3.64 -0.26 -2.66 2.65 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 yes no yes yes 0.53 25.2 0.27 3.83 -0.23 -3.33 3.23 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 yes no no yes 0.47 15.8 0.24 3.42 -0.15 -3.00 5.02 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 yes no no yes 0.42 16.7 0.23 3.14 -0.22 -3.69 3.51 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 yes no yes yes 0.39 18.0 0.16 2.37 -0.30 -4.51 2.76 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 yes no no yes 0.40 17.3 0.15 2.32 -0.23 -4.12 3.69 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 yes no no yes 0.49 15.8 0.14 2.49 -0.12 -2.84 7.26 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 yes no no yes 0.35 4.50 0.09 1.67 -0.08 -2.29 12.16 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 yes no no no 0.31 7.97 0.06 1.79    
 Jan-99 Dec-04 yes no no yes 0.27 7.23 0.03 1.08 -0.12 -2.96 8.38 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 yes no no yes 0.18 7.31 0.04 0.97 -0.15 -3.16 6.25 
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Table A 4.1: Summary of Inertest Rate Pass-Through Analysis                 
Country Rolling Sample Cointegration? Long-run PT Short-run PT ECM(s) ML 
  From To JJ EG CRDW Kremers Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat   
 Jan-01 Dec-06 yes no no no 0.23 5.84 0.04 0.62    
  Jan-02 Dec-07 yes no no no 0.30 1.32 0.02 0.06       
Malawi Jan-90 Dec-95 yes yes yes yes 0.82 22.0 0.49 2.98 -0.29 -3.58 1.76 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 yes no yes yes 0.84 26.2 0.58 4.89 -0.29 -3.57 1.43 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 yes no yes yes 0.85 22.5 0.59 4.89 -0.29 -3.54 1.44 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 yes no yes yes 0.85 20.5 0.74 6.96 -0.27 -3.28 0.99 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 yes no yes yes 0.97 21.7 0.78 7.11 -0.24 -3.10 0.92 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 yes no yes yes 1.03 23.3 1.07 11.2 -0.37 -5.08 0.18 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 yes no yes yes 0.91 24.7 0.38 5.69 -0.26 -3.12 2.37 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 yes no yes yes 0.94 24.6 0.33 5.05 -0.25 -3.22 2.72 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 yes no yes yes 0.79 18.4 0.37 5.99 -0.43 -4.84 1.47 
 Jan-99 Dec-04 yes no yes yes 0.73 22.3 0.35 5.95 -0.39 -3.93 1.67 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 yes no yes yes 0.78 28.9 0.36 6.30 -0.40 -4.29 1.61 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 yes no yes yes 0.79 32.5 0.50 9.19 -0.59 -7.40 0.84 
  Jan-02 Dec-07 yes no yes yes 0.91 116.8 0.84 25.1 -0.40 -4.06 0.40 
Mozambique Jan-90 Dec-95            
 Jan-91 Dec-96            
 Jan-92 Dec-97            
 Jan-93 Dec-98 yes no yes yes 0.86 4.09 -0.18 -0.37 -0.91 -2.93 1.30 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 yes no yes yes 1.17 6.24 -0.09 -0.23 -0.46 -2.91 2.35 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 yes yes yes yes 1.30 7.73 -0.05 -0.15 -0.38 -3.31 2.73 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 yes no yes yes 1.22 7.42 -0.04 -0.14 -0.30 -3.06 3.48 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 yes no yes yes 1.05 5.17 -0.04 -0.14 -0.13 -1.83 8.10 
 Jan-98 Dec-03            
 Jan-99 Dec-04            
 Jan-00 Dec-05            
 Jan-01 Dec-06            
  Jan-02 Dec-07                       
Namibia Jan-90 Dec-95 yes yes yes yes 0.82 16.0 -0.06 -0.38 -0.65 -5.80 1.63 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 yes yes yes yes 0.80 13.9 -0.19 -0.90 -0.74 -5.92 1.62 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 yes yes yes yes 0.81 11.4 -0.11 -0.56 -0.63 -5.65 1.77 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 yes yes yes yes 0.82 12.9 0.26 1.73 -0.56 -5.25 1.32 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 yes no yes yes 0.64 10.7 0.19 1.20 -0.44 -4.49 1.83 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 yes yes yes yes 0.66 16.5 0.20 1.25 -0.54 -5.26 1.49 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 yes yes yes yes 0.72 22.7 0.14 0.89 -0.64 -5.93 1.35 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 yes no yes yes 0.84 23.3 0.17 1.36 -0.46 -5.90 1.82 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 yes no yes yes 0.81 20.7 0.13 1.04 -0.49 -6.26 1.79 
 Jan-99 Dec-04 yes no yes yes 0.93 18.5 -0.01 -0.05 -0.45 -5.93 2.26 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 yes no yes yes 0.85 17.7 -0.11 -0.72 -0.44 -5.93 2.52 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 yes no yes yes 0.82 18.5 -0.13 -0.92 -0.54 -7.16 2.09 
  Jan-02 Dec-07 yes no yes yes 0.78 20.2 -0.07 -0.46 -0.61 -7.17 1.75 
South Africa Jan-90 Dec-95 yes yes yes yes 0.95 60.6 0.40 5.67 -0.89 -10.2 0.67 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 yes yes yes yes 1.00 44.3 0.57 6.73 -0.80 -8.05 0.55 
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Table A 4.1: Summary of Inertest Rate Pass-Through Analysis                 
Country Rolling Sample Cointegration? Long-run PT Short-run PT ECM(s) ML 
  From To JJ EG CRDW Kremers Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat   
 Jan-92 Dec-97 yes yes yes yes 1.02 47.2 0.65 8.15 -0.81 -7.90 0.43 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 yes yes yes yes 0.98 42.2 0.42 5.58 -0.85 -9.27 0.68 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 yes yes yes yes 0.98 41.1 0.46 6.32 -0.87 -9.22 0.62 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 yes yes yes yes 1.03 40.5 0.48 6.05 -0.73 -8.12 0.71 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 yes yes yes yes 1.04 47.1 0.55 7.01 -0.62 -7.01 0.73 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 yes yes yes yes 1.01 49.7 0.61 8.17 -0.57 -6.26 0.68 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 yes no yes yes 1.00 47.4 0.64 8.80 -0.54 -5.90 0.67 
 Jan-99 Dec-04 yes no yes yes 0.98 48.8 0.85 13.8 -0.21 -3.00 0.73 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 yes no no yes 0.93 48.7 0.87 27.6 -0.06 -1.55 2.12 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 yes yes no yes 0.96 64.6 0.90 30.9 -0.14 -2.86 0.74 
  Jan-02 Dec-07                       
Swaziland Jan-90 Dec-95 yes no yes yes 1.02 39.0 0.86 19.7 -0.19 -3.07 0.76 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 yes yes yes yes 0.99 91.1 0.86 22.9 -0.53 -5.41 0.26 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 yes yes yes yes 0.99 166.6 0.87 29.1 -0.84 -7.49 0.15 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 yes yes yes yes 0.99 201.4 0.96 85.9 -0.83 -16.1 0.05 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 yes yes yes yes 1.00 445.3 0.97 110.1 -0.99 -8.31 0.03 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 yes yes yes yes 1.00 457.6 0.97 110.5 -1.00 -8.36 0.03 
 Jan-96 Dec-01            
 Jan-97 Dec-02            
 Jan-98 Dec-03            
 Jan-99 Dec-04 yes no no yes 0.94 128.0 0.97 65.4 -0.08 -1.65 0.32 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 yes no no yes 0.90 134.3 0.96 57.5 -0.08 -1.49 0.48 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 yes no no yes 0.90 144.2 0.96 61.2 -0.09 -1.49 0.42 
  Jan-02 Dec-07 yes no no yes 0.91 157.3 0.96 61.1 -0.14 -2.18 0.26 
Tanzania Jan-90 Dec-95 yes no yes no 0.27 8.78 0.04 0.80    
 Jan-91 Dec-96 yes no yes yea 0.30 8.81 0.37 5.56 -0.31 -2.13 2.05 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 yes no yes no 0.33 10.2 0.08 1.80    
 Jan-93 Dec-98 yes no no no 0.39 9.30 0.08 1.88    
 Jan-94 Dec-99 yes no no yes 0.48 10.6 0.09 2.47 -0.07 -1.84 13.5 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 yes yes no yes 0.53 12.4 0.14 3.19 -0.12 -2.89 7.29 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 yes no no yes 0.65 7.44 0.09 1.83 -0.11 -4.09 7.95 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 yes no no yes 0.40 4.94 0.07 1.36 -0.07 -2.35 13.4 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 yes no no no 0.46 6.05 0.12 2.09    
 Jan-99 Dec-04 yes no no no 0.31 2.72 0.08 1.07    
 Jan-00 Dec-05 yes no no no -0.01 -0.13 0.05 0.47    
 Jan-01 Dec-06 yes no no yes -0.32 -4.07 -0.05 -0.70 -0.12 -3.00 8.44 
Zambia Jan-90 Dec-95 yes yes yes yes 1.05 31.17 0.66 7.33 -0.31 -2.84 1.12 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 yes yes yes yes 1.06 33.71 0.63 7.87 -0.28 -3.06 1.31 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 yes yes yes yes 0.98 31.1 0.58 8.10 -0.20 -2.90 2.09 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 yes yes yes yes 0.98 31.8 0.44 6.82 -0.23 -3.83 2.42 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 yes no yes yes 0.83 16.5 0.26 5.79 -0.12 -2.85 6.23 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 no no no yes 0.61 10.9 0.22 2.86 -0.15 -2.77 5.16 
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Table A 4.1: Summary of Inertest Rate Pass-Through Analysis                 
Country Rolling Sample Cointegration? Long-run PT Short-run PT ECM(s) ML 
  From To JJ EG CRDW Kremers Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat   
 Jan-96 Dec-01 no no no yes 0.62 11.2 0.27 3.08 -0.14 -2.26 5.3 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 yes no no yes 0.58 8.05 0.36 3.26 -0.13 -1.94 5.12 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 yes no yes yes 0.63 11.1 0.24 2.80 -0.21 -2.30 3.54 
 Jan-99 Dec-04 yes no yes yes 0.58 16.7 0.23 3.18 -0.26 -3.32 2.93 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 yes no yes yes 0.67 18.4 0.22 3.40 -0.18 -3.21 4.32 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 yes no yes yes 0.77 21.3 0.17 2.75 -0.13 -2.92 6.46 
  Jan-02 Dec-07 yes no no yes 0.98 16.5 0.09 1.43 -0.07 -2.61 12.2 
Notes: JJ – Johansen maximum likelihood method, CRDW – cointegrating regression Durbin-Watson, EG - 
Engle-Granger, PT – pass-through, MAL – mean adjustment lag calculated as Equation 4 in the previous 
chapter. In cases where results for the entire rolling window were not reported this indicates that there was 
either an insufficient observations to estimate the model or the series were representative of a near singular 
matrix in which the model could not be estimated. 
 
Source: Estimates by author. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
 
5.1. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
 
This thesis examined how the pass-through of central bank rates to lending rates has 
evolved over time in an attempt to determine the extent of convergence in terms of 
monetary policy transmission for ten SADC countries for the sample period from January 
1990 to December 2007. The results of the estimation of the empirical-pass through 
model clearly show that there are certain countries that have a more stable and efficient 
monetary transmission process than others. In particular, the countries that form the 
SACU (with the exception of Lesotho) tend to show evidence of convergence in 
monetary policy transmission over the estimation period, especially for periods following 
the 2000-2005 rolling window.  
 
In addition, results from the analysis of the long-run pass-through analysis reveal that 
there is evidence that Malawi and Zambia have shown signs of convergence toward the 
degree of pass-through in Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and 
Swaziland. Thus, it is clear that using the degree of interest-rate pass-through as a 
measure of macroeconomic convergence the results reveal that the development of the 
extent of convergence is not similar for all the countries included in the study. Moreover, 
although differences in pass-through exist in the sample of countries that was analysed, in 
terms of the short-run and long-run pass-through as measured by responses of the lending 
rate to policy-induced changes in the central bank rate, there is some evidence for 
convergence of monetary policy transmission.  
 
However, the results of this study are similar to those of Khamfula and Huizinga (2004) 
and Aziakpono et al. (2007) in that there are similarities with regard to the countries that 
are perceived as being able to form an intermediate monetary union prior to the formation 
of a SADC monetary union. The primary conclusion of this study is that a SADC wide 
monetary union is currently not feasible based on the evidence provided from the 
empirical results of the pass-through analysis. Despite this, based on the results of the 
pass-through model, it can be tentatively suggested that the CMA may be expanded to 
include Botswana, Malawi and Zambia. Combining this result with the findings of 
Khamfula and Huizinga (2004) and Aziakpono et al. (2007), possibly, Mauritius and 
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Seychelles may further be added to an expanded CMA. However, requirements of such 
an expansion include more stringent policy coordination procedures as well as measures 
aimed at addressing any country specific financial market imperfections that may exist.    
 
In terms of policy implications relating to monetary unification it is important to realise 
that gradualism in designing, as well as implementing a regional integration arrangement 
such as a monetary union is of the utmost importance. Thus, for the non-converging 
countries, the immediate goal of financial and macroeconomic stability should be pursued 
relentlessly in an attempt to catch up to the convergence group of countries mentioned 
above. Finally, owing to the diverse nature of the SADC countries, in terms of the levels 
of economic development, it would be advisable that the more advanced member states 
of the region take initiatives to control and monitor credible policy formulation and 
implementation. This will ensure that the remaining countries are able to reach similar 
levels of economic and financial development before a region wide monetary union is 
formed in the future.          
 
5.2. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY  
 
The analysis provided in this report would not be complete without stating some of the 
limitations of this study. Although the results of the study are generally robust, the major 
limitation of this study was that the pass-through of monetary policy transmission was the 
only measure that was used to determine the extent of macroeconomic convergence 
amongst the ten countries that were analysed. This limitation of the study is, however, 
predominantly due to the limited availability of consistent and complete data for the 
variables that form the SADC convergence criteria (inflation rate, budget deficit, 
government debt, foreign reserves and central bank credit to the government). Hence, it 
was not possible to present any empirical evidence relating to these SADC convergence 
variables in this report. In addition, the analysis also only focused on the transmission of 
the CBR to the LR due to time constraints. Future studies could examine the pass-through 
to other interest rates. Despite these limitations, the study still provides some useful 
insights into the progress of macroeconomic convergence and the goal of forming a 
monetary union in SADC. Thus, the study has contributed to the limited literature on the 
subject of monetary unification in sub-Saharan Africa in general and the SADC countries 
in particular.  
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5.3. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
As mentioned earlier in this study, the majority of papers concerning the issue of 
monetary integration in SADC focus primarily on descriptive statistics that relate to the 
majority of the SADC convergence criteria that have been set out by the CCBG. 
Therefore, there is limited empirical literature relating to monetary unification in the 
SADC. Hence, as sufficient and consistent data becomes available it will be necessary to 
conduct empirical research that makes use of the SADC convergence criteria variables in 
an attempt to better understand the true extent of the degree of macroeconomic 
convergence that exists in the region. This will, therefore, allow researchers to propose 
more credible policy suggestions relating to the future formation of a regional SADC 
monetary union.   
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APPENDIX A: 
SUMMARY OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table A1: Summary of Empirical Literature 
Author and Year Countries 
considered in the 
study 
Sample Period Empirical Approach Summary of findings 
Bayoumi and Ostry 
(1997) 
 
 
 
11 SADC 
countries 
(Angola, 
Botswana, 
Lesotho, 
Malawi, 
Mozambique, 
Namibia, South 
Africa, 
Swaziland, 
Tanzania, 
Zambia, 
Zimbabwe). 
1963-1989 Estimated second order autoregressions of per 
capita growth, thus, residuals represent 
underlying real output disturbances. Correlations 
of shocks across countries were calculated from 
the residuals.  
5 out of 55 correlations relating to the southern 
African countries were positive and significant, 
however, the results tend to make little 
geographical sense owing to the distinct lack of 
significant correlations between South Africa and 
its neighbouring countries.  
Agbeyegbe (2003) 9 SADC 
countries 
(excludes all 4 
CMA countries) 
1992 – 2000 
(Exch. Rate) 
and 
1980 – 2000 
(Infl. Rate) 
Applied the methodology of time varying 
(Kalman Filter) analysis to study nine, non CMA, 
member countries of SADC, and based on the 
analysis to determine whether the member 
countries point towards a direction of being able 
to join a new single currency system. The 
methodology adopted in the study follows Hall, 
Robertson and Wickens (HRW) (1992). 
Exchange Rate - results suggest differing (non) 
convergence among the non-CMA countries to the 
rand. For all but one country, the results show that 
there is no evidence of movement towards the rand 
rate, the exception being Malawi’s Kwacha. 
  
Inflation Rate – results do not provide evidence in 
support of non-stationarity for both the individual 
inflation rates and the differential rates between 
each non-CMA country and the averages of the 
CMA countries. Hence, the results reveal that 
inflation rates in the non-CMA countries do not 
converge to the average of the CMA countries. 
Grandes (2003) The 4 CMA 
countries plus 
Botswana.  
1990 - 2001 The author made use of a two-step econometric 
model that was based on the theory of generalised 
purchasing power parity (G-PPP). Essentially, 
The econometric evidence from the study suggest 
that the CMA and Botswana do indeed form an 
OCA given the existence of the common long-run 
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Author and Year Countries 
considered in the 
study 
Sample Period Empirical Approach Summary of findings 
Grandes (2003) tested for cointegration among 
bilateral exchange rates, using the rand as the base 
currency for the four CMA countries and 
Botswana. 
trends in their bilateral exchange rates. 
Khamfula and Huizinga 
(2004) 
10 SADC 
countries 
(excludes 
Angola, 
Mozambique, 
Seychelles and 
the democratic 
republic of 
Congo) 
1980 - 1996 A Generalised Auto-Regressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model was 
employed to consider the share of the variation in 
real exchange rates (RER’s) vis-à-vis South 
Africa that can be explained by the divergence in 
monetary and fiscal policies. The residuals from 
the autoregressive model were used to estimate 
unanticipated component of bilateral RER against 
the South African rand. 
 
The results of both the short-run and long-run 
cases suggest that the conditional variances of the 
RER disturbances between South Africa and most 
other SADC countries are comparable and, hence, 
the following countries would be suitable to form a 
monetary union; South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Namibia, Swaziland and 
Zimbabwe. That said, it should be noted that the 
results revealed low degrees of symmetry of RER 
shocks across most of the economies considered. 
This clearly indicates that the costs of forming a 
monetary union would generally be higher than the 
relative benefits. 
Kabundi and Loots 
(2005) 
13 SADC 
countries 
(Tanzania was 
excluded 
because of lack 
of data). 
1980 - 2002 The study made use of a dynamic factor model to 
investigate the impact of increasing trade on the 
co-movement of the business cycle between South 
Africa and the SADC countries. The real growth 
rate (represented by annual real GDP data) was 
used to analyse the co-movement between the 
South African business cycle and the SADC 
covering the period 1980-2002. 
The empirical results of the study revealed that the 
strongest correlation for the entire period exists 
between South Africa and Mozambique, followed 
by weaker correlations between South Africa and 
Angola, Zambia, Lesotho, Mauritius and 
Swaziland. Amongst the SACU countries strong 
evidence of co-movement exists from the early 
1990’s onwards. Strong co-movement is evident 
between South Africa and Zimbabwe until 1998. In 
conclusion, the study identified three factors as 
possible sources of synchonisation of business 
cycles within the SADC region, namely intra-
regional trade, the European Union as a major 
trading partner and the world business cycle. 
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Author and Year Countries 
considered in the 
study 
Sample Period Empirical Approach Summary of findings 
Buigut (2006) 20 African 
countries 
including all 
SADC countries 
except for 
Zimbabwe 
Data for the 
variables used 
in the study 
was averaged 
over various 
sub periods 
between 1990-
2003 
depending on 
availability 
To recover the underlying shocks, the VAR 
identification scheme developed by Blanchard 
and Quah (1989) was used, however, cluster 
analysis was applied to variables such as 
correlations of demand and supply shocks, trade 
intensity, debt service ratio, public debt ratio, tax 
revenue ratio and the inflation rate.  
The results of the study conclude that there is 
support for a monetary union in Southern Africa, 
under the assumption that the Rand was the anchor 
currency, for a small group of countries consisting 
of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and 
Swaziland. Under scenarios (2) and (3) described 
above Buigut (2006) found that a group of four 
countries was suitable for a monetary union, 
namely; Botswana, Namibia, South Africa and 
Swaziland. 
Buigut and Valev (2006) 21 African 
countries 
including all 
SADC countries 
except for 
Zimbabwe 
1971-2002  
and  
1980-2002 
Utilised a two-step VAR model.  More 
specifically, to recover the underlying shocks, the 
VAR identification scheme developed by 
Blanchard and Quah (1989). 
 
Real GDP growth was used to measure the 
changes in output, while the changes in the 
implicit GDP deflator represent price changes. 
For each country, the first difference of the 
natural log of real GDP and the implicit GDP 
deflator were used for estimation. 
The results of the supply shocks showed that South 
Africa has significant correlations in the supply 
shocks it faces with those faced by its neighboring 
states of Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique. 
However, based on the correlations and 
geographical proximity that were revealed in the 
study Buigut and Valev (2006) tentatively suggest 
a tripolar route to monetary union with the first 
region comprising that of the southern cone 
consisting of the existing CMA, expanding 
northwards to include Botswana, Mozambique and 
Zambia 
Karras (2007) 
 
 
37 African 
countries of 
which  
10 were SADC 
countries (Dem. 
Rep. Congo, 
Lesotho, 
Madagascar, 
Mozambique, 
Mauritius, 
Malawi, 
1960 – 2000 
(IFS) 
and 
1980 –2000 
(Penn World 
Table Stats) 
Calculated correlations of detrended output 
growth using real GDP based on purchasing-
power-parity real exchange rates. 
Used three different filter methods to detrend the 
output series of each country and estimate its 
cyclical component. The three methods were (1) 
first differencing, (2) the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) 
filter, and (3) the Band-pass filter.  
Estimated correlations of each country’s cyclical 
output against the SADC total. 
Three of the eight sets of correlations were above 
0.40 (those for Mozambique, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe), thus, indicating that these three 
countries represent an optimal currency area with 
South Africa.  
 
61 
 
Author and Year Countries 
considered in the 
study 
Sample Period Empirical Approach Summary of findings 
Tanzania, South 
Africa, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe) 
Jefferis (2007) 
 
12 SADC 
countries 
(Excluding 
Madagascar and 
Zimbabwe) 
1990-1996 
and  
1997-2002 
The study examined the correlations of bilateral 
exchange rate changes against the South African 
rand as well as considering bilateral (nominal) 
interest rate and inflation rate differentials vis-à-
vis South Africa.  
Based on the findings from the correlations and 
differentials of the variables used the author 
identified what was termed a ‘convergence group’ 
which consists of 8 SADC countries. However, the 
term convergence group was not defined within the 
study. 
Aziakpono et al., (2007) 14 SADC 
countries 
1990-2005 In an attempt to investigate the monetary and 
banking market integration in SADC the method 
of principal component analysis (PCA) and an 
empirical pass-through model was applied to 
central bank interest rates as well as to deposit 
and loan interest rates. 
The results of the study confirmed the authors’ 
expectations that the CMA banking markets are 
most integrated followed by the SACU countries. 
There was also evidence in the study that 
suggested that the level of integration increases 
over time for each region and interest rate. The 
study also subjected the entire SADC region to 
further analysis focusing on the period between 
2000-2005 where there is evidence of growing 
integration with the aim of sorting the countries 
into groups that are becoming integrated based on 
similarities of their movements. From the evidence 
found in the analysis Aziakpono et al., (2007:29) 
suggest that a selective, yet cautionary expansion 
of the CMA is possible. More specifically, 
Seychelles, Zambia and Botswana are potential 
first candidates. 
Key to abbreviations: CMA – Common Monetary Area, GARCH – Generalised Auto-Regressive Conditional Heteroscedasticity, GDP – Gross Domestic Product, G-PPP –  
Generalised Purchasing Power Parity, OCA – Optimal Currency Area, PCA – Principal Component Analysis, RER – Real Exchange Rate, SACU – Southern African 
Customs Union, SADC – Southern African Development Community, VAR – Vector Autoregressive  
 
Source: Compiled by author. 
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APPENDIX B: 
UNIT ROOT TEST SUMMARY (Bank Rates and Lending Rates) 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Table B1: Unit Root Tests (Bank Rates)                         
Country Test Series 
1990-
1995 
1991-
1996 
1992-
1997 
1993-
1998 
1994-
1999 
1995-
2000 
1996-
2001 
1997-
2002 
1998-
2003 
1999-
2004 
2000-
2005 
2001-
2006 
2002-
2007 
Botswana DF-GLS* Level -0.43 -1.08 -1.21 -0.92 -1.61 -1.12 -0.85 0.09 -0.63 -1.12 -2.36b -1.07 -1.44 
  1st Diff -8.39a -7.28a -8.14a -7.10a -10.3a -11.5a -12.2a -11.7a -9.25a -12.2a -12.3a -6.99a -4.52a 
 PP* Level  -2.65c -2.09 -1.96 -1.86 -1.50 -1.74 -1.22 -0.53 -1.96 -2.48 -2.82c -1.66 -2.00 
  1st Diff -8.41a -10.0a -8.08a -8.02a -9.99a -11.7a -13.2a -12.8a -12.1a -12.6a -12.4a -7.01a -7.16a 
 DF-GLS** Level  -1.00 -1.16 -1.67 -2.85c -1.64 -1.16 -1.77 -3.67b -3.01c -1.80 -2.89c -1.40 -1.54 
  1st Diff -8.74a -7.42a -8.43a -7.10a -5.27a -11.8a -12.3a -11.9a -10.6a -12.2a -12.3a -7.01a -4.54a 
 PP** Level  -1.34 -1.86 -4.47 -2.94 -1.30 -1.76 -2.73 -4.02b -2.79 -2.46 -2.83 -1.71 -1.96 
    1st Diff -9.26a -10.1a -8.44a -8.04a -9.92a -14.5a -13.7a -13.2a -13.3a -12.9a -12.5a -6.97a -7.14a 
Lesotho DF-GLS* Level -1.06 -1.25 -0.97 -1.36 -0.97 -1.46 -1.46 -1.70c -1.65c -0.45 -0.63 -0.76 -1.32 
  1st Diff -7.86a -7.55a -7.95a -8.21a -8.27a -8.25a -8.25a -8.22a -8.20a -8.28a -8.27a -8.19a -7.95a 
 PP* Level  -1.80 -1.31 -2.14 -1.45 -1.68 -2.45 -1.52 -1.73 -1.73 -1.37 -1.95 -1.11 -1.40 
  1st Diff -7.82a -7.57a -7.90a -8.19a -8.24a -8.19a -8.19a -8.16a -8.14a -8.27a -8.25a -8.16a -7.89a 
 DF-GLS** Level  -1.65 -1.21 -1.33 -2.55 -3.19b -2.21 -1.5 -1.89 -1.94 -1.72 -1.69 -1.65 -1.68 
  1st Diff -7.91a -7.37a -8.07a -8.26a -8.29a -8.38a -8.39a -8.22a -8.23a -8.32a -8.32a -8.27a -7.96a 
 PP** Level  -1.74 -1.17 -2.24 -2.91 -3.32c -2.29 -1.49 -2.01 -2.46 -1.77 -1.94 -1.63 -2.39 
    1st Diff -7.83a -7.54a -8.04a -8.24a -8.18a -8.33a -8.32a -8.10a -8.12a -8.22a -8.25a -8.15a -7.86a 
Madagascar DF-GLS* Level -0.28 -1.63c -0.95 -0.90 -0.96 -0.40 0.12 -0.73 -1.18 -0.99 -0.77 -1.04 -0.90 
  1st Diff -2.68a -2.09b -5.91a -5.98a -6.23a -6.50a -7.51a -8.38a -8.31a -8.34a -8.33a -8.31a -8.32a 
 PP* Level  0.76 -1.21 -1.13 -1.04 -1.09 -0.91 -3.58 -2.57 -1.17 -1.16 -0.90 -1.20 -1.29 
  1st Diff -5.59a -5.80a -6.05a -6.12a -6.21a -6.48a -7.53a -8.38a -8.28a -8.31a -8.36a -8.34a -8.36a 
 DF-GLS** Level  -1.41 -1.91 -0.77 -1.14 -1.21 -1.01 -1.02 -1.68 -1.45 -1.04 -0.90 -1.20 -1.09 
  1st Diff -3.07c -2.16b -6.09a -6.14a -6.35a -6.52a -4.25a -8.45a -8.45a -8.44a -8.49a -8.31a -8.35a 
 PP** Level  -0.92 -1.06 -0.57 -1.16 -1.98 -1.30 -2.71 -2.44 -1.80 -0.77 -1.03 -1.66 -1.23 
    1st Diff -5.91a -5.84a -6.08a -6.16a -6.33a -6.44a -7.78a -8.38a -8.78a -8.34a -8.45a -8.29a -8.34a 
Malawi DF-GLS* Level 1.89c -0.67 -0.77 -0.52 -0.87 -1.17 -1.52 -1.31 -1.31 -1.43 -1.18 -1.86 0.64 
  1st Diff -8.82a -6.89a -6.93a -6.87a -6.73a -5.98a -8.91a -9.62a -1.64c -9.67a -9.67a -14.4a -7.75a 
 PP* Level  1.01 -1.29 -1.56 -1.53 -1.57 -1.29 -1.80 -1.88 -3.02b -1.42 -1.27 -1.68 -0.86 
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Table B1: Unit Root Tests (Bank Rates)                         
Country Test Series 
1990-
1995 
1991-
1996 
1992-
1997 
1993-
1998 
1994-
1999 
1995-
2000 
1996-
2001 
1997-
2002 
1998-
2003 
1999-
2004 
2000-
2005 
2001-
2006 
2002-
2007 
  1st Diff -9.05a -7.08a -7.11a -7.04a -6.93a -6.15a -8.83a -9.53a -9.38a -9.62a -9.62a -13.3a -7.86a 
 DF-GLS** Level  -1.00 -0.65 -0.50 -1.20 -1.33 -1.26 -1.80 -2.01 -1.78 -2.50 -2.84c -3.40b -2.17 
  1st Diff -9.54a -6.99a -7.18a -6.77a -6.75a -5.94a -8.95a -9.69a -8.14a -9.77a -9.71a -14.7a -7.87a 
 PP** Level  -1.07 -0.85 -0.78 -1.53 -1.58 -1.33 -2.58 -1.93 -2.64 -2.69 -3.31 -3.59b -2.27 
    1st Diff -9.44a -7.16a -7.32a -6.99a -6.89a -6.15a -8.83a -9.58a -9.54a -9.70a -9.58a -13.9a -7.81a 
Mozambique DF-GLS* Level -1.28 -0.63 0.13 0.06 -0.24 -0.28 -0.36 -0.51 x x x x x 
  1st Diff -4.67a -4.80a -5.70a -6.41a -7.03a -6.36a -2.75a -5.46a x x x x x 
 PP* Level  -1.67 -0.82 0.13 -0.16 -0.38 -1.71 -2.87c -4.08 x x x x x 
  1st Diff -4.56a -4.77a -5.70a -6.45a -7.13a -6.69a -5.66a -9.15a x x x x x 
 DF-GLS** Level  -1.08 -0.55 -0.93 -1.18 -1.16 -0.79 -1.70 -2.48 x x x x x 
  1st Diff -5.35a -6.02a -6.46a -6.72a -7.17a -6.65a -5.01a -5.68a x x x x x 
 PP** Level  -0.37 0.19 -1.67 -2.36 -2.26 -0.60 -1.49 -2.55 x x x x x 
    1st Diff -5.75a -6.55a -6.43a -6.68a -7.14a -6.92a -6.15a -9.87a x x x x x 
Namibia DF-GLS* Level -0.81 -0.73 -2.98b -2.42 -1.86c -1.58 -0.87 -1.22 -1.27 0.62 -1.37 -1.30 -1.55 
  1st Diff -6.35a -7.05a -8.03a -3.98a -3.33a -1.92c -3.37a -3.42a -2.83a -6.07a -6.46a -3.68a -3.75a 
 PP* Level  -2.25 -2.24 -2.93b -1.57 -1.27 -0.84 -0.59 -1.43 -1.07 -2.84c -0.95 -1.44 -1.20 
  1st Diff -6.33a -7.05a -8.03a -7.39a -6.38a -6.50a -6.61a -6.71a -6.29a -6.29a -6.85a -6.86a -6.58a 
 DF-GLS** Level  -0.52 -0.72 -3.44c -3.63b -2.09 -2.08 -2.52 -2.4 -2.78 -2.17 -2.68 -2.51 -1.51 
  1st Diff -7.23a -7.68a -8.11a -3.88a -3.55b -2.92c -3.44b -3.46b -2.87c -6.08a -6.53a -3.74a -3.86a 
 PP** Level  -0.62 -1.75 -3.43c -2.95 -0.81 -1.98 -2.08 -1.60 -1.88 -2.92 -1.84 -1.51 -0.87 
    1st Diff -8.89a -7.98a -8.11a -7.30a -6.77a -6.59a -6.55a -6.72a -6.28a -6.35a -6.83a -6.88a -6.60a 
South Africa DF-GLS* Level -0.50 -0.73 -0.82 -1.42 -1.51 -1.57 -1.16 -1.32 -1.24 -0.40 -1.57 -1.77c -1.48 
  1st Diff -8.38a -8.31a -8.31a -5.50a -4.85a -3.40a -4.91a -5.07a -3.19a -2.91b -2.48b -3.65a -3.43a 
 PP* Level  -1.37 -1.44 -1.36 -0.71 -1.69 -1.47 -0.79 -1.47 -1.17 -2.65c -0.88 -1.44 -1.16 
  1st Diff -8.40a -8.29a -8.30a -5.40a -4.84a -4.90a -4.92a -5.09a -5.16a -7.09a -7.54a -7.53a -7.26a 
 DF-GLS** Level  -0.43 -0.25 -1.10 -2.96c -1.78 -1.68 -1.96 -2.08 -2.73 -2.38 -2.77 -2.72 -1.36 
  1st Diff -8.64a -9.16a -8.66a -4.76a -5.01a -4.51a -5.02a -5.09a -3.25b -2.82 -2.52a -2.40 -3.66b 
 PP** Level  0.07 -0.57 -2.84 -3.03 -0.82 -1.81 -2.02 -1.77 -1.99 -2.84 -1.85 -1.52 -0.71 
    1st Diff -8.71a -9.54a -8.73a -5.32a -5.02a -4.91a -5.00a -5.08a -5.15a -7.11a -7.54a -7.54a -7.31a 
Swaziland DF-GLS* Level -0.19 0.39 -0.33 -0.29 -0.81 -0.89 0.24 -0.65 -1.00 -0.57 -1.71c -1.90c -1.48 
  1st Diff -8.39a -8.43a -8.37a -8.78a -6.84a -6.84a -6.66a -6.80a -3.99a -2.82a -2.44b -2.29b -3.43a 
 PP* Level  -0.21 0.64 -0.40 -0.27 -1.63 -1.12 -0.31 -1.44 -1.14 -2.43 -0.89 -1.32 -1.16 
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Table B1: Unit Root Tests (Bank Rates)                         
Country Test Series 
1990-
1995 
1991-
1996 
1992-
1997 
1993-
1998 
1994-
1999 
1995-
2000 
1996-
2001 
1997-
2002 
1998-
2003 
1999-
2004 
2000-
2005 
2001-
2006 
2002-
2007 
  1st Diff -8.38a -8.44a -8.34a -8.80a -6.87a -6.86a -6.83a -7.15a -6.95a -6.73a -7.38a -7.39a -7.26a 
 DF-GLS** Level  -0.75 -0.52 -1.21 -1.89 -0.22 -1.06 -1.14 -2.15 -2.56 -2.15 -2.49 -2.52 -1.36 
  1st Diff -8.63a -9.06a -8.48a -7.15a -7.23a -7.24a -6.87a -6.89a -3.98b -2.81c -2.48 -2.33 -3.66b 
 PP** Level  -0.37 -0.48 -1.85 -2.32 -0.19 -1.97 -2.05 -1.13 -1.71 -2.42 -1.65 -1.51 -0.71 
    1st Diff -8.54a -9.10a -8.37a -8.74a -7.33a -7.37a -6.95a -7.21a -6.93a -6.87a -7.40a -7.37a -7.31a 
Tanzania DF-GLS* Level -0.88 -1.37 -1.44 -1.51 -1.54 -0.33 -0.29 -1.11 -1.16 -1.23 -0.71 -0.12 -1.41 
  1st Diff -5.45a -5.28a -6.84a -7.10a -5.69a -7.62a -4.05a -2.06b -4.76a -2.13b -2.74a -3.57a -2.91a 
 PP* Level  -0.92 -1.78 -1.75 -1.85 -1.94 -3.51b -3.61 -1.62 -1.73 -1.64 -1.99 -0.51 -1.66 
  1st Diff -5.87a -4.82a -6.68a -6.96a -7.70a -7.64a -6.59a -6.91a -7.43a -6.86a -6.07a -4.81a -8.44a 
 DF-GLS** Level  -2.36 -1.99 -1.47 -1.62 -1.92 -1.70 -1.93 -2.27 -2.24 -1.23 -0.43 -2.21 -4.40a 
  1st Diff -5.49a -4.98a -6.88a -7.14a -4.94a -7.78a -5.64a -5.43a -6.37a -4.63a -7.34a -3.70a -3.12c 
 PP** Level  -2.34 -2.16 -1.55 -1.93 -3.26 -3.39c -4.00b -2.24 -2.02 -1.44 -3.44c -2.86 -3.41c 
    1st Diff -5.77a -4.79a -6.73a -6.99a -7.58a -7.91a -6.52a -6.89a -7.38a -6.78a -7.18a -4.79a -8.41a 
Zambia DF-GLS* Level -1.84c -2.01b -1.93c -0.74 -1.04 -0.74 -0.88 -0.07 -1.07 -0.73 -0.63 -0.96 -0.23 
  1st Diff -3.90a -4.45a -4.72a -5.70a -4.83a -3.65a -3.68a -2.98a -3.46a -6.94a -7.14a -2.55b -3.92a 
 PP* Level  -1.62 -1.82 -1.64 -1.25 -1.85 -0.92 -0.59 -1.95 -0.73 -1.18 -1.26 -0.88 -2.54 
  1st Diff -4.06a -4.68a -5.09a -5.62a -5.52a -4.84a -5.65a -4.98a -3.68a -6.97a -7.61a -7.92a -7.63a 
 DF-GLS** Level  -2.01 -2.18 -2.27 -1.83 -2.25 -1.12 -0.82 -0.82 -0.59 -1.86 -1.65 -2.60 -1.37 
  1st Diff -4.09a -4.67a -5.13a -3.76a -5.31a -4.62a -4.66a -4.48a -3.75b -6.89a -7.41a -3.86a -4.17a 
 PP** Level  -1.87 -2.10 -2.31 -2.78 -2.16 -1.73 -0.34 -2.80 -0.27 -1.86 -2.11 -2.85 -2.49 
    1st Diff -4.04b -4.65a -5.09a -5.52a -5.51a -4.87a -5.81a -5.06a -3.62b -6.89a -7.56a -7.85a -7.82a 
Notes:  The rolling periods run from January to December of the years indicated. “x” indicates that the interest rate series was constant for the period. s” indicates that there 
was an insufficient number of observations for the test to be carried out. “*” and “**” indicates where the unit root tests were carried out with an intercept and a trend and 
intercept respectively. Significance levels regarding the rejection of the null hypothesis (H0) are indicated with a, b, and c for 1%, 5% and, 10%, respectively. This note 
applies to both Table B1 and Table B2. 
  
Source: Estimates by author. 
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Table B2: Unit Root Tests (Lending Rates)                       
Country Test Series 
1990-
1995 
1991-
1996 
1992-
1997 
1993-
1998 
1994-
1999 
1995-
2000 
1996-
2001 
1997-
2002 
1998-
2003 
1999-
2004 
2000-
2005 
2001-
2006 
2002-
2007 
Botswana DF-GLS* Level -0.32 -0.63 -1.21 -2.40 -0.57 0.16 -0.18 1.00 -0.21 -0.46 -0.96 -1.30 -1.40 
  1st Diff -7.91a -1.66c -8.95a -9.16a -8.90a -7.63a -7.46a -6.74a -6.74a -7.19a -6.43a -6.85a -4.42a 
 PP* Level  -1.90 -2.79c -3.91a -2.40 -1.47 -0.35 -0.40 0.09 -2.20 -2.54 -2.04 -1.66 -2.00 
  1st Diff -8.02a -10.1a -8.91a -9.32a -8.83a -7.66a -7.47a -6.81a -7.25a -7.19a -6.35a -6.83a -6.81a 
 DF-GLS** Level  -1.40 -1.63 -1.77 -2.83c -1.48 -0.92 -1.16 -1.67 -0.83 -1.11 -2.12 -1.4 -1.50 
  1st Diff -8.04a -4.37a -9.27a -7.03a -8.68a -7.80a -7.63a -6.94a -7.20a -4.50a -6.46a -6.91a -4.44a 
 PP** Level  -1.37 -2.34 -4.00b -2.83 -1.53 -0.89 -1.82 -2.40 -0.91 -1.83 -1.94 -1.72 -1.95 
    1st Diff -8.34a -10.1a -9.28a -9.31a -8.78a -7.70a -7.54a -6.85a -7.70a -7.25a -6.35a -6.78a -6.79a 
Lesotho DF-GLS* Level -1.34 -1.37 -1.47 -1.35 -1.20 -1.48 -1.75c -1.82c -0.95 0.60 0.11 -1.28 -1.06 
  1st Diff -9.47a -13.9a -6.45a -10.1a -7.28a -4.59a -7.38a -7.30a -4.46a -8.22a -6.46a -2.42b -3.46a 
 PP* Level  -2.46 -2.66c -3.68 -2.06 -1.94 -2.44 -2.12 -1.99 -1.10 -1.78 -0.37 -1.22 -1.23 
  1st Diff -20.2a -16.5a -16.3a -14.1a -7.23a -7.49a -7.29a -7.21a -6.95a -8.37a -6.72a -6.23a -6.54a 
 DF-GLS** Level  -2.74 -1.71 -1.95 -4.14 -1.97 -1.85 -1.92 -2.03 -1.69 -1.56 -2.04 -1.92 -0.82 
  1st Diff -9.49a -14.1a -6.75a -11.8a -7.36a -6.44a -7.43a -7.30a -4.25a -8.36a -6.62a -2.54 -3.71a 
 PP** Level  -4.95a -2.68 -3.83b -4.47a -2.02 -2.24 -2.23 -2.20 -2.35 -2.34 -1.81 -1.15 -0.25 
    1st Diff -21.1a -20.9a -18.3a -14.9a -7.27a -7.46a -7.29a -7.15a -7.09a -8.36a -6.74a -6.28a -6.81a 
Madagascar DF-GLS* Level 0.94 -0.48 -0.75 -0.90 -0.98 -0.82 0.29 -0.12 0.11 -0.82 -0.91 -0.36 -0.33 
  1st Diff -9.28a -9.51a -9.32a -9.16a -9.16a -9.10a -8.72a -8.50a -8.45a -8.34a -8.31a -8.37a -8.39a 
 PP* Level  1.79 -0.82 -1.28 -1.29 -1.39 -0.97 -2.51 -2.04 -0.16 -1.35 -1.35 0.44 -0.13 
  1st Diff -9.34a -9.47a -9.23a -9.06a -9.06a -9.03a -8.90a -8.59a -8.69a -8.32a -8.25a -8.52a -8.50a 
 DF-GLS** Level  -0.99 -1.49 -0.92 -0.79 -1.21 -1.50 -1.21 -1.95 -2.03 -1.63 -0.44 -1.18 -1.63 
  1st Diff -10.2a -9.55a -9.45a -9.48a -9.38a -9.10a -9.07a -8.63a -8.59a -8.41a -8.81a -8.72a -8.60a 
 PP** Level  -0.69 -1.71 -0.66 -0.88 -2.28 -3.62b -1.82 -2.33 -2.43 -1.42 0.10 -0.58 -1.52 
    1st Diff -12.59a -9.40a -9.34a -9.50a -9.32a -9.03a -9.28a -8.82a -8.78a -8.40a -9.03a -11.39a -9.87a 
Malawi DF-GLS* Level 0.17 -0.89 -1.02 -0.96 -0.80 -0.68 -0.98 -0.75 -0.86 -0.20 -0.25 0.29 0.47 
  1st Diff -8.44a -7.83a -7.83a -7.48a -7.57a -7.39a -7.45a -2.30b -1.81c -8.43a -8.36a -8.70a -7.51a 
 PP* Level  0.01 -1.45 -1.64 -1.62 -1.46 -1.61 -1.24 -1.35 -3.28b -0.46 -0.68 -0.94 -0.90 
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Table B2: Unit Root Tests (Lending Rates)                       
Country Test Series 
1990-
1995 
1991-
1996 
1992-
1997 
1993-
1998 
1994-
1999 
1995-
2000 
1996-
2001 
1997-
2002 
1998-
2003 
1999-
2004 
2000-
2005 
2001-
2006 
2002-
2007 
  1st Diff -8.44a -7.84a -7.85a -7.48a -7.61a -7.45a -7.45a -8.28a -7.56a -8.42a -8.36a -8.81a -7.54a 
 DF-GLS** Level  -1.63 -1.59 -1.00 -1.39 -1.34 -1.38 -1.27 -1.07 -0.96 -1.72 -2.06 -2.56 -2.04 
  1st Diff -8.71a -7.87a -7.98a -7.50a -7.58a -7.17a -7.50a -3.45b -3.71a -8.62a -8.45a -8.81a -7.54a 
 PP** Level  -2.06 -1.83 -1.13 -1.66 -1.58 -1.68 -2.13 -1.00 -2.5 -1.82 -2.47 -2.55 -2.13 
    1st Diff -8.63a -7.84a -7.96a -7.43a -7.56a -7.39a -7.47a -8.47a -8.01a -8.52a -8.34a -8.79a -7.48a 
Mozambique DF-GLS* Level s s s -1.78c -1.41 -1.13 -1.16 -1.06 -1.43 -0.95 -0.90 -1.08 -0.53 
  1st Diff s s s -3.94a -5.54a -6.59a -7.28a -7.86a -2.30b -6.88a -7.03a -7.44a -7.78a 
 PP* Level  s s s -1.83 -2.60 -3.22b -3.26b -2.47 -1.49 -1.26 -1.13 -1.21 -1.11 
  1st Diff s s s -3.78b -5.47a -6.64a -7.23a -7.79a -8.43a -6.88a -7.03a -7.35a -7.80a 
 DF-GLS** Level  s s s -2.34 -2.77 -2.52 -1.54 -1.18 -1.55 -0.78 -0.82 -1.46 -2.02 
  1st Diff s s s -3.97a -5.80a -6.90a -7.79a -8.39a -6.04a -6.98a -7.23a -7.49a -7.81a 
 PP** Level  s s s -2.10 -2.74 -3.07 -2.37 -2.48 -1.70 -0.48 -1.16 -2.54 -2.16 
    1st Diff s s s -3.66c -5.64a -7.19a -8.47a -8.98a -8.40a -6.94a -7.14a -7.38a -7.74a 
Namibia DF-GLS* Level -0.55 -0.43 -1.46 -1.20 -1.38 -1.00 -1.12 -0.79 -0.68 0.57 -0.01 -1.20 -0.91 
  1st Diff -9.72a -2.73a -11.4a -11.5a -11.5a -9.58a -11.4a -10.7a -10.5a -11.1a -1.95b -2.76a -11.6a 
 PP* Level  -2.34 -2.57 -2.58 -1.61 -2.41 -1.44 -0.80 -1.21 -1.23 -2.54 -1.11 -1.77 -1.37 
  1st Diff -10.8a -12.5a -13.2a -11.6a -11.2a -11.3a -11.5a -10.5a -10.6a -11.4a -11.6a -11.2a -11.0a 
 DF-GLS** Level  -0.78 -1.13 -1.75 -2.24 -2.40 -1.18 -2.22 -2.15 -2.13 -1.43 -1.72 -2.46 -0.78 
  1st Diff -10.5a -2.85c -12.0a -11.6a -11.1a -11.4a -11.7a -10.8a -10.8a -11.9a -11.1a -3.33b -11.1a 
 PP** Level  -1.06 -1.76 -2.71 -4.10a -2.36 -2.15 -2.47 -2.25 -2.16 -3.12 -2.41 -1.87 -1.25 
    1st Diff -13.5a -13.9a -14.2a -12.1a -11.5a -11.5a -11.6a -10.4a -10.5a -11.5a -11.6a -11.3a -11.0a 
South Africa DF-GLS* Level -0.57 -0.78 -0.87 -1.27 -1.52 -1.45 -1.14 -1.28 -1.14 -0.43 -1.73c -1.93c -1.48 
  1st Diff -7.90a -7.54a -7.54a -4.17a -5.41a -3.60a -5.29a -5.39a -3.79a -2.91b -2.41b -2.26c -3.43a 
 PP* Level  -1.31 -1.31 -1.32 -0.81 -1.80 -1.37 -0.87 -1.48 -1.23 -2.67c -0.89 -1.32 -1.16 
  1st Diff -7.91a -7.49a -7.49a -5.64a -5.45a -5.48a -5.21a -5.42a -5.43a -7.06a -7.24a -7.26a -7.26a 
 DF-GLS** Level  -0.40 -0.46 -1.13 -2.99c -1.82 -1.57 -2.01 -2.46 -2.29 -2.42 -2.52 -2.55 -1.36 
  1st Diff -8.13a -8.02a -7.75a -5.41a -5.55a -5.01a -5.37a -5.41a -3.82a -3.60b -2.45 -2.30 -3.66b 
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Table B2: Unit Root Tests (Lending Rates)                       
Country Test Series 
1990-
1995 
1991-
1996 
1992-
1997 
1993-
1998 
1994-
1999 
1995-
2000 
1996-
2001 
1997-
2002 
1998-
2003 
1999-
2004 
2000-
2005 
2001-
2006 
2002-
2007 
 PP** Level  0.04 -0.61 -2.50 -2.63 -1.15 -1.85 -2.13 -1.61 -1.86 -2.66 -1.66 -1.51 -0.71 
    1st Diff -8.17a -8.19a -7.74a -5.55a -5.57a -5.53a -5.26a -5.42a -5.41a -7.16a -7.26a -7.24a -7.31a 
Swaziland DF-GLS* Level 0.16 0.69 -0.32 0.38 -0.80 -0.90 0.24 -0.65 -0.99 -0.55 -1.76c -1.97b -1.47 
  1st Diff -7.49a -7.30a -7.31a -8.16a -6.59a -6.59a -6.66a -6.80a -3.99a -2.88a -2.47b -2.30b -3.44a 
 PP* Level  -0.28 0.65 -0.39 -0.24 -1.62 -1.12 -0.31 -1.44 -1.21 -2.63c -0.95 -1.36 -1.12 
  1st Diff -7.49a -7.87a -7.83a -8.21a -6.63a -6.62a -6.83a -7.15a -7.26a -7.16a -8.07a -8.04a -8.00a 
 DF-GLS** Level  -0.73 -0.48 -1.15 -1.80 -0.71 -1.07 -1.14 -2.15 -2.47 -2.05 -2.44 -2.48 -1.32 
  1st Diff -7.67a -7.72a -7.91a -8.32a -6.98a -6.99a -6.87a -6.89a -4.03a -2.88c -2.51 -2.34 -3.67b 
 PP** Level  -0.50 -0.32 -1.92 -2.23 -0.18 -1.95 -2.05 -1.13 -1.72 -2.53 -1.63 -1.51 -0.69 
    1st Diff -7.57a -8.36a -7.86a -8.21a -7.08a -7.13a -6.95a -7.21a -7.23a -7.33a -8.09a -8.03a -8.05a 
Tanzania DF-GLS* Level -0.28 -1.37 -0.86 -0.68 0.07 -0.81 0.47 0.82 0.65 0.33 -0.55 -0.65 -1.74c 
  1st Diff -6.81a -3.30a -7.95a -8.20a -8.30a -5.26a -8.85a -8.57a -8.56a -8.55a -8.73a -7.64a -2.72a 
 PP* Level  -0.35 -1.55 -0.84 -0.64 -0.56 -1.23 -4.51 -2.62c -0.43 -0.45 -1.23 -3.58 -3.03b 
  1st Diff -7.09a -3.77a -7.91a -8.16a -8.26a -8.30a -8.98a -8.59a -8.62a -8.63a -8.71a -8.75a -11.1a 
 DF-GLS** Level  -2.67 -2.45 -0.93 -1.18 -1.65 -1.91 -1.22 -1.67 -2.06 -2.20 -1.67 -1.07 -2.33 
  1st Diff -6.96a -3.11c -8.19a -8.40a -8.29a -5.32a -9.09a -2.89c -8.63a -7.95a -8.75a -8.31a -9.09a 
 PP** Level  -2.87 -2.29 -0.96 -1.70 -2.01 -1.28 -3.76b -3.67b -2.03 -2.47 -1.55 -2.03 -3.18c 
    1st Diff -7.32a -3.57b -8.13a -8.32a -8.22a -8.31a -9.70a -8.49a -8.56a -8.57a -8.71a -12.1a -11.4a 
Zambia DF-GLS* Level -1.30 -1.43 -1.48 -1.91 -1.45 -2.09b -1.30 -0.72 -0.99 -0.76 -0.24 0.29 1.28 
  1st Diff -5.38a -5.47a -5.42a -5.88a -1.81c -2.31b -5.17a -2.69a -7.77a -7.51a -6.68a -9.02a -9.79a 
 PP* Level  -1.60 -1.67 -1.55 -1.26 -2.99b -1.46 -1.51 -2.70c -1.91 -0.59 -0.41 0.15 -1.63 
  1st Diff -3.40b -3.36b -3.31b -5.95a -3.65a -6.61a -6.31a -6.58a -7.90a -7.99a -7.11a -9.73a -9.76a 
 DF-GLS** Level  -1.42 -1.51 -1.65 -1.90 -2.27 -2.37 -1.30 -1.24 -1.26 -1.08 -1.26 -1.85 -1.99 
  1st Diff -5.44a -5.50a -5.52a -5.94a -2.15c -2.50c -5.81a -6.01a -7.94a -8.31a -7.25a -8.92a -10.0a 
 PP** Level  -1.40 -1.69 -2.16 -2.10 -2.40 -2.17 -1.32 -3.24c -1.28 -1.39 -1.79 -5.12a -2.26 
    1st Diff -3.31b -3.27b -3.27c -6.38a -4.28a -6.68a -6.37a -6.70a -8.09a -8.22a -7.14a -9.58a -9.96a 
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APPENDIX C:  
COINTEGRATION ANALYSIS SUMMARY 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table C1: Cointegration Analysis                        
     Johansen Test       
 Rolling Sample   Trace Max    ECM(s)  
Country From To Obs K r<0 r<1 r<0 r<1 EG Prob. CRDW Coeff t-stat Coint? 
Botswana Jan-90 Dec-95 72 3 32.1[0.00] 12.4[0.05] 19.6[0.05] 12.4[0.05] -2.95 0.00 0.45 -0.27 -3.68 Yes 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 72 4 18.4[0.02] 1.04[0.3] 17.3[0.02] 1.06[0.3] -1.72 0.08 0.37 -0.22 -2.21 Yes 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 72 0 25.2[0.00] 3.35[0.52] 21.9[0.01] 3.35[0.52] -3.67 0.00 0.43 -0.32 -4.02 Yes 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72 0 29.7[0.02] 6.95[0.35] 22.7[0.02] 6.95[0.35] -2.42 0.02 0.65 -0.10 -0.89 No 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72 0 22.7[0.03] 1.88[0.98] 25.9[0.00] 1.88[0.98] -1.55 0.11 0.33 -0.17 -2.80 Yes 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 1 18.5[0.02] 0.13[0.72] 18.4[0.01] 0.13[0.72] -3.28 0.00 0.47 -0.16 -3.11 Yes 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 72 1 34.5[0.00] 0.15[0.69] 34.3[0.00] 0.15[0.69] -7.86 0.00 1.87 -0.40 -5.58 Yes 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 72 1 32.8[0.00] 0.02[0.89] 32.8[0.00] 0.02[0.89] -8.01 0.00 1.91 -0.42 -5.65 Yes 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 72 1 37.8[0.00] 5.88[0.48] 31.9[0.00] 5.88[0.48] -8.12 0.00 1.91 -0.47 -5.92 Yes 
 Jan-99 Dec-04 72 1 33.9[0.00] 2.92[0.08] 30.9[0.00] 2.92[0.08] -8.47 0.00 1.73 -0.36 -4.23 Yes 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 72 3 133[0.00] 4.24[0.7] 129[0.00] 4.24[0.7] -7.50 0.00 1.76 -0.41 -4.64 Yes 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 72 2 27.7[0.03] 4.61[0.65] 23.0[0.01] 4.61[0.65] -7.20 0.00 1.70 -0.87 -7.25 Yes 
  Jan-02 Dec-07 72 2 34.1[0.00] 4.42[0.68] 29.7[0.00] 4.42[0.68] -7.51 0.00 1.78 -0.85 -7.21 Yes 
Lesotho Jan-90 Dec-95 72 1 16.4[0.04] 2.38[0.12] 14.0[0.05] 2.38[0.12] -4.91 0.00 1.03 -0.34 -2.91 Yes 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 72 1 38.5[0.00] 1.40[0.24] 37.1[0.00] 1.4[0.24] -6.94 0.00 1.48 -0.72 -4.24 Yes 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 72 1 39.4[0.00] 8.67[0.20] 30.7[0.00] 8.67[0.20] -7.22 0.00 1.70 -0.75 -4.42 Yes 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72 1 30.8[0.00] 1.47[0.22] 29.3[0.00] 1.47[0.22] -7.60 0.00 1.81 -0.80 -5.12 Yes 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72      -2.16 0.03 0.43 -0.12 -1.35 Yes 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72      -2.32 0.02 0.28 -0.12 -1.89 Yes 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 72      -2.26 0.02 0.27 -0.13 -2.10 Yes 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 72      -2.10 0.03 0.24 -0.12 -1.93 Yes 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 72      -0.84 0.35 0.19 -0.04 -0.71 No 
 Jan-99 Dec-04 72      -2.04 0.04 0.16 -0.04 -0.97 No 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 72      -1.02 0.28 0.09 0.01 0.26 No 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 72 0 19.9[0.00] 2.46[0.12] 17.4[0.01] 2.46[0.12] -1.27 0.19 0.12 0.01 0.51 No 
  Jan-02 Dec-07 72 1 22.5[0.02] 4.89[0.3] 17.6[0.03] 4.89[0.3] -1.49 0.13 0.08 0.01 0.21 No 
Madagascar Jan-90 Dec-95 72 4 15.5[0.05] 1.14[0.29] 14.4[0.05] 1.14[0.29] -3.18 0.00 0.63 -0.26 -2.66 Yes 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 72 0 17.4[0.03] 1.37[0.24] 16.0[0.03] 1.37[0.24] -2.08 0.04 0.40 -0.23 -3.33 Yes 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 72 1 26.3[0.04] 2.51[0.93] 23.8[0.01] 2.51[0.93] -1.09 0.25 0.21 -0.15 -3.00 Yes 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72 2 17.4[0.03] 2.49[0.11] 14.9[0.04] 2.49[0.11] -2.53 0.01 0.28 -0.22 -3.69 Yes 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72 1 29.3[0.00] 3.29[0.53] 26.0[0.00] 3.29[0.53] -2.36 0.02 0.37 -0.30 -4.51 Yes 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 1 21.8[0.03] 5.66[0.22] 16.2[0.05] 5.66[0.22] -3.09 0.00 0.29 -0.23 -4.12 Yes 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 72 0 29.0[0.00] 7.32[0.11] 21.7[0.01] 7.32[0.11] -2.01 0.04 0.22 -0.12 -2.84 Yes 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 72      -1.54 0.11 0.10 -0.08 -2.29 Yes 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 72      -2.04 0.04 0.15 -0.04 -1.03 No 
 Jan-99 Dec-04 72      -1.89 0.06 0.18 -0.12 -2.96 Yes 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 72      -2.38 0.02 0.19 -0.15 -3.16 Yes 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 72      -0.46 0.51 0.20 -0.05 -0.76 No 
  Jan-02 Dec-07 72      -0.44 0.52 0.13 -0.02 -0.42 No 
Malawi Jan-90 Dec-95 72      -3.32 0.00 0.51 -0.29 -3.58 Yes 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 72      -3.22 0.00 0.53 -0.29 -3.57 Yes 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 72      -3.24 0.00 0.52 -0.29 -3.54 Yes 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72      -3.10 0.00 0.48 -0.27 -3.28 Yes 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72      -2.96 0.00 0.45 -0.24 -3.10 Yes 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 4 29.8[0.02] 6.40[0.41] 23.4[0.01] 6.40[0.41] -4.35 0.00 0.39 -0.37 -5.08 Yes 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 72 4 20.4[0.00] 1.78[0.18] 18.6[0.01] 1.78[0.18] -4.95 0.00 1.02 -0.26 -3.12 Yes 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 72 1 20.4[0.00] 2.94[0.09] 17.5[0.02] 2.94[0.09] -5.17 0.00 1.11 -0.25 -3.22 Yes 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 72 1 29.9[0.00] 4.98[0.30] 25.0[0.00] 4.98[0.30] -5.72 0.00 1.14 -0.43 -4.84 Yes 
 Jan-99 Dec-04 72 1 25.9[0.00] 0.32[0.57] 25.5[0.00] 0.32[0.57] -6.00 0.00 1.35 -0.39 -3.93 Yes 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 72 1 27.8[0.00] 0.59[0.44] 27.2[0.00] 0.59[0.44] -6.20 0.00 1.41 -0.40 -4.29 Yes 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 72 3 44.6[0.00] 0.63[0.43] 44.0[0.00] 0.63[0.43] -6.18 0.00 1.35 -0.59 -7.40 Yes 
  Jan-02 Dec-07 72 0 15.7[0.05] 0.75[0.39] 15.4[0.04] 0.75[0.39] -2.41 0.02 0.75 -0.40 -4.06 Yes 
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Table C1: Cointegration Analysis                        
     Johansen Test       
 Rolling Sample   Trace Max    ECM(s)  
Country From To Obs K r<0 r<1 r<0 r<1 EG Prob. CRDW Coeff t-stat Coint? 
Mozambique Jan-90 Dec-95   Insufficient number of observations to estimate VAR      
 Jan-91 Dec-96   Insufficient number of observations to estimate VAR      
 Jan-92 Dec-97   Insufficient number of observations to estimate VAR      
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72 2 24.9[0.01] 6.68[0.14] 18.3[0.03] 6.68[0.14] -2.97 0.01 1.52 -0.91 -2.93 Yes 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72 1 45.1[0.00] 3.85[0.43] 41.3[0.00] 3.85[0.43] -2.89 0.01 0.96 -0.46 -2.91 Yes 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 4 59.8[0.00] 8.37[0.22] 51.5[0.00] 8.37[0.22] -3.17 0.00 0.82 -0.38 -3.31 Yes 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 72 4 58.8[0.00] 3.81[0.05] 50.0[0.00] 3.81[0.05] -2.91 0.00 0.63 -0.30 -3.06 Yes 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 72 4 59.5[0.00] 0.15[0.69] 59.3[0.00] 0.15[0.69] -1.78 0.07 0.32 -0.13 -1.83 Yes 
 Jan-98 Dec-03   Near Singular matrix (log of non positive number)      
 Jan-99 Dec-04   Near Singular matrix (cannot estimate VAR)       
 Jan-00 Dec-05   Near Singular matrix (cannot estimate VAR)       
 Jan-01 Dec-06   Near Singular matrix (cannot estimate VAR)       
  Jan-02 Dec-07     Near Singular matrix (cannot estimate VAR)             
Namibia Jan-90 Dec-95 72 0 38.6[0.00] 5.44[0.24] 33.2[0.00] 5.44[0.24] -3.13 0.00 1.26 -0.65 -5.80 Yes 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 72 1 22.3[0.03] 5.51[0.23] 16.7[0.04] 5.51[0.23] -6.27 0.00 1.55 -0.74 -5.92 Yes 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 72 1 24.0[0.01] 6.67[0.15] 17.3[0.03] 6.67[0.15] -5.69 0.00 1.23 -0.63 -5.65 Yes 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72 1 19.6[0.01] 3.18[0.07] 16.4[0.02] 3.18[0.07] -4.87 0.00 1.05 -0.56 -5.25 Yes 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72 4 27.1[0.03] 5.05[0.59] 22.1[0.02] 5.05[0.59] -2.42 0.02 0.77 -0.44 -4.49 Yes 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 1 20.7[0.01] 1.34[0.25] 19.4[0.01] 1.34[0.25] -3.23 0.00 0.90 -0.54 -5.26 Yes 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 72 3 22.2[0.01] 1.07[0.30] 21.2[0.01] 1.07[0.30] -5.48 0.00 1.15 -0.64 -5.93 Yes 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 72      -2.29 0.02 0.69 -0.46 -5.90 Yes 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 72 3 30.1[0.01] 9.8[0.14] 20.3[0.04] 9.80[0.14] -2.45 0.01 0.71 -0.49 -6.26 Yes 
 Jan-99 Dec-04 72 3 34.2[0.00] 11.1[0.09] 23.2[0.01] 11.1[0.09] -2.53 0.01 0.75 -0.45 -5.93 Yes 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 72      -2.62 0.01 0.74 -0.44 -5.93 Yes 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 72 3 28.1[0.03] 8.3[0.23] 19.8[0.04] 8.30[0.23] -2.92 0.00 0.83 -0.54 -7.16 Yes 
  Jan-02 Dec-07 72 1 27.3[0.00] 3.43[0.06] 23.9[0.00] 3.43[0.06] -2.45 0.01 0.88 -0.61 -7.17 Yes 
South Africa Jan-90 Dec-95 72 1 23.8[0.00] 1.97[0.16] 21.8[0.00] 1.97[0.16] -7.58 0.00 1.80 -0.89 -10.20 Yes 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 72 1 23.3[0.00] 1.87[0.17] 21.4[0.00] 1.87[0.17] -6.77 0.00 1.55 -0.80 -8.05 Yes 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 72 1 24.4[0.00] 1.73[0.19] 22.7[0.00] 1.73[0.19] -6.87 0.00 1.60 -0.81 -7.90 Yes 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72 1 25.0[0.00] 1.77[0.18] 23.2[0.00] 1.77[0.18] -5.32 0.00 1.16 -0.85 -9.27 Yes 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72 2 19.0[0.01] 2.41[0.12] 16.6[0.02] 2.41[0.12] -5.60 0.00 1.23 -0.87 -9.22 Yes 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 1 30.0[0.01] 4.98[0.60] 25.0[0.01] 4.98[0.60] -4.96 0.00 1.06 -0.73 -8.12 Yes 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 72 0 50.1[0.00] 0.31[0.58] 49.8[0.00] 0.31[0.58] -4.63 0.00 0.94 -0.62 -7.01 Yes 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 72      -4.55 0.00 0.92 -0.57 -6.26 Yes 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 72 4 20.4[0.05] 3.09[0.56] 17.3[0.03] 3.09[0.56] -3.09 0.00 0.85 -0.54 -5.90 Yes 
 Jan-99 Dec-04 72      -1.76 0.07 0.42 -0.21 -3.00 Yes 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 72      -1.60 0.10 0.11 -0.06 -1.55 Yes 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 72 3 22.2[0.03] 3.70[0.46] 18.5[0.02] 3.70[0.46] -3.72 0.00 0.17 -0.14 -2.86 Yes 
  Jan-02 Dec-07     Near Singular Matrix                 
Swaziland Jan-90 Dec-95 72      -2.86 0.00 0.33 -0.19 -3.07 Yes 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 72 1 19.1[0.01] 0.39[0.53] 18.7[0.01] 0.39[0.53] -5.57 0.00 0.85 -0.53 -5.41 Yes 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 72 1 29.3[0.00] 0.19[0.66] 29.1[0.00] 0.19[0.66] -7.11 0.00 1.55 -0.84 -7.49 Yes 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72 1 92.5[0.00] 0.27[0.60] 92.3[0.00] 0.27[0.60] -7.23 0.00 1.71 -0.83 -16.09 Yes 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72 1 33.4[0.00] 2.55[0.11] 30.8[0.00] 2.55[0.11] -8.56 0.00 2.04 -0.99 -8.31 Yes 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 0 58.2[0.00] 0.50[0.48] 57.7[0.00] 0.50[0.48] -8.55 0.00 2.04 -1.00 -8.36 Yes 
 Jan-96 Dec-01   Near Singular matrix         
 Jan-97 Dec-02   Near Singular matrix         
 Jan-98 Dec-03   Near Singular matrix         
 Jan-99 Dec-04 72 1 19.4[0.01] 0.50[0.48] 18.9[0.01] 0.50[0.48] -2.16 0.03 0.16 -0.08 -1.65 Yes 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 72      -1.63 0.10 0.26 -0.08 -1.49 No 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 72      -1.48 0.13 0.28 -0.09 -1.49 Yes 
  Jan-02 Dec-07 72      -1.71 0.08 0.30 -0.14 -2.18 Yes 
Tanzania Jan-90 Dec-95 72      -2.36 0.02 0.52 -0.05 -0.46 No 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 72 4 17.2[0.03] 2.58[0.11] 14.7[0.04] 2.58[0.11] -2.63 0.01 0.79 -0.31 -2.13 Yes 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 72      -2.31 0.02 0.37 -0.08 -1.19 No 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72      -2.01 0.04 0.26 -0.04 -0.92 No 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72 3 16.3[0.04] 0.74[0.39] 15.6[0.03] 0.74[0.39] -2.86 0.00 0.27 -0.07 -1.84 Yes 
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Table C1: Cointegration Analysis                        
     Johansen Test       
 Rolling Sample   Trace Max    ECM(s)  
Country From To Obs K r<0 r<1 r<0 r<1 EG Prob. CRDW Coeff t-stat Coint? 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 0 23.6[0.00] 2.71[0.10] 20.9[0.00] 2.71[0.10] -3.13 0.00 0.28 -0.12 -2.89 Yes 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 72 0 34.9[0.00] 8.21[0.08] 26.7[0.00] 8.21[0.08] -2.60 0.01 0.17 -0.11 -4.09 Yes 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 72      -2.53 0.01 0.09 -0.07 -2.35 Yes 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 72      -1.20 0.21 0.09 -0.03 -0.92 No 
 Jan-99 Dec-04 72      -0.25 0.59 0.05 -0.01 -0.58 No 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 72 0 19.9[0.01] 3.05[0.08] 16.9[0.02] 3.05[0.08] -1.32 0.17 0.05 -0.03 -0.92 No 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 72 2 29.5[0.02] 9.67[0.14] 19.8[0.04] 9.67[0.14] -2.84 0.01 0.13 -0.12 -3.00 Yes 
  Jan-02 Dec-07 72 4 29.7[002] 8.47[0.22] 21.3[0.03] 21.3[0.03] -3.15 0.00 0.37 -0.19 -2.53 Yes 
Zambia Jan-90 Dec-95 72 2 20.0[0.01] 20.2[0.16] 18.0[0.01] 20.2[0.16] -3.60 0.00 0.86 -0.31 -2.84 Yes 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 72 2 23.3[0.00] 2.46[0.12] 20.8[0.00] 2.46[0.12] -3.96 0.00 0.84 -0.28 -3.06 Yes 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 72      -3.16 0.00 0.50 -0.20 -2.90   Yes 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72 4 21.1[0.04] 3.45[0.50] 17.6[0.03] 3.45[0.50] -3.18 0.00 0.53 -0.23 -3.83 Yes 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72 2 32.8[0.00] 5.91[0.20] 26.9[0.00] 5.91[0.20] -2.66 0.01 0.34 -0.12 -2.85 Yes 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 1 28.6[0.00] 3.41[0.07] 25.2[0.00] 3.41[0.07] -1.16 0.22 0.19 -0.15 -2.77 Yes 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 72 0 18.7[0.02] 3.05[0.08] 15.7[0.03] 3.05[0.08] -1.21 0.20 0.21 -0.14 -2.26 Yes 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 72 4 22.1[0.03] 3.90[0.43] 18.3[0.03] 3.90[0.43] -1.22 0.20 0.18 -0.13 -1.94 Yes 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 72      -1.90 0.06 0.50 -0.21 -2.30 Yes 
 Jan-99 Dec-04 72      -2.73 0.01 0.53 -0.26 -3.32 Yes 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 72      -2.63 0.01 0.37 -0.18 -3.21 Yes 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 72 2 24.0[0.01] 6.85[0.13] 17.1[0.03] 6.85[0.13] -2.49 0.01 0.33 -0.13 -2.92 Yes 
  Jan-02 Dec-07 72 0 32.1[0.01] 7.34[0.31] 24.7[0.01] 7.34[0.31] -1.92 0.05 0.26 -0.07 -2.61 Yes 
 Notes: Parenthesis [ ] are used to denote probability values. EG - Engle-Granger approach. CRDW – 
cointegrating regression Durbin-Watson. 
 
Source: Estimates by author.  
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APPENDIX D: 
LONG-RUN ROLLING REGRESSION MODEL SUMMARY 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table D1: Long -Run Model Analysis               
 Rolling Sample Obs Intercept Slope Adj. R2 DW 
Country From To   Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat     
Botswana Jan-90 Dec-95 72 0.87 2.11 0.96 29.6 0.92 0.45 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 72 -0.01 -0.01 1.04 11.3 0.65 0.37 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 72 8.21 10.2 0.45 7.56 0.44 0.43 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72 8.18 13.6 0.46 10.0 0.58 0.65 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72 8.26 8.83 0.46 6.36 0.36 0.33 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 5.24 6.11 0.70 10.8 0.62 0.47 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 72 2.13 4.51 0.95 26.6 0.91 1.87 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 72 1.96 5.05 0.97 33.6 0.94 1.91 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 72 1.91 4.79 0.97 33.9 0.94 1.91 
 Jan-99 Dec-04 72 3.36 6.26 0.87 23.0 0.88 1.73 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 72 4.90 8.23 0.76 18.5 0.83 1.76 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 72 1.59 26.72 0.99 243.0 1.00 1.70 
  Jan-02 Dec-07 72 1.60 22.17 0.99 200.9 1.00 1.78 
Lesotho Jan-90 Dec-95 72 -1.10 -0.61 1.18 10.4 0.60 1.03 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 72 -0.36 -0.25 1.12 12.3 0.68 1.48 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 72 0.68 0.45 1.04 10.8 0.62 1.70 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72 -0.12 -0.11 1.10 16.6 0.79 1.81 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72 2.03 2.34 0.95 18.0 0.82 0.43 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 6.77 5.01 0.66 8.41 0.50 0.28 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 72 8.44 7.13 0.57 8.22 0.48 0.27 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 72 9.16 8.87 0.53 8.65 0.51 0.24 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 72 8.03 6.58 0.58 7.98 0.47 0.19 
 Jan-99 Dec-04 72 6.39 5.07 0.63 8.02 0.47 0.16 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 72 4.57 3.03 0.71 7.09 0.41 0.09 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 72 -0.10 -0.05 1.04 7.33 0.43 0.12 
  Jan-02 Dec-07 72 2.77 1.64 0.83 6.65 0.38 0.08 
Madagascar Jan-90 Dec-95 72 19.9 60.5 0.49 27.2 0.92 0.63 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 72 19.5 46.2 0.53 25.2 0.90 0.40 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 72 21.4 35.9 0.47 15.8 0.78 0.21 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72 22.8 45.9 0.42 16.7 0.80 0.28 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72 23.5 53.8 0.39 18.0 0.82 0.37 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 23.2 50.6 0.40 17.3 0.81 0.29 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 72 21.7 44.8 0.49 15.8 0.78 0.22 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 72 23.0 25.5 0.35 4.50 0.21 0.10 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 72 22.8 54.4 0.31 7.97 0.47 0.15 
 Jan-99 Dec-04 72 22.8 55.7 0.27 7.23 0.42 0.18 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 72 23.3 78.1 0.18 7.31 0.42 0.19 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 72 22.9 49.3 0.23 5.84 0.32 0.20 
  Jan-02 Dec-07 72 24.6 9.02 0.30 1.32 0.01 0.13 
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Table D1: Long -Run Model Analysis               
 Rolling Sample Obs Intercept Slope Adj. R2 DW 
Country From To   Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat     
Malawi Jan-90 Dec-95 72 9.52 9.85 0.82 22.1 0.87 0.51 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 72 8.86 8.87 0.84 26.2 0.91 0.53 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 72 8.24 6.74 0.85 22.5 0.88 0.52 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72 8.81 6.21 0.85 20.5 0.85 0.48 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72 5.05 2.98 0.97 21.7 0.87 0.45 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 3.01 1.66 1.03 23.3 0.88 0.39 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 72 8.15 5.18 0.91 24.7 0.90 1.02 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 72 7.43 4.51 0.94 24.5 0.89 1.11 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 72 15.3 7.95 0.79 18.4 0.83 1.14 
 Jan-99 Dec-04 72 17.7 12.1 0.73 22.3 0.87 1.35 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 72 15.0 13.3 0.78 28.9 0.92 1.41 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 72 14.3 15.4 0.79 32.5 0.94 1.35 
  Jan-02 Dec-07 72 10.6 42.7 0.91 116.8 0.99 0.75 
Mozambique Jan-90 Dec-95  Insufficient number of data observations to estimate model 
 Jan-91 Dec-96  Insufficient number of data observations to estimate model 
 Jan-92 Dec-97  Insufficient number of data observations to estimate model 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72 15.2 5.66 0.86 4.09 0.50 1.52 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72 9.93 4.53 1.17 6.24 0.58 0.96 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 7.80 4.14 1.30 7.73 0.60 0.82 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 72 9.09 5.05 1.22 7.42 0.51 0.63 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 72 11.9 5.40 1.05 5.17 0.29 0.32 
 Jan-98 Dec-03  Near Singular Matrix    
 Jan-99 Dec-04  Near Singular Matrix    
 Jan-00 Dec-05  Near Singular Matrix    
 Jan-01 Dec-06  Near Singular Matrix    
  Jan-02 Dec-07  Near Singular Matrix       
Namibia Jan-90 Dec-95 72 5.18 6.09 0.82 16.0 0.83 1.26 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 72 5.45 5.65 0.80 13.9 0.75 1.55 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 72 5.28 4.40 0.81 11.4 0.64 1.23 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72 5.14 4.78 0.82 12.9 0.70 1.05 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72 8.38 8.40 0.64 10.7 0.62 0.77 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 8.13 12.4 0.66 16.5 0.79 0.90 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 72 7.31 15.1 0.72 22.7 0.88 1.15 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 72 5.57 10.9 0.84 23.3 0.88 0.69 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 72 5.90 11.4 0.81 20.7 0.86 0.71 
 Jan-99 Dec-04 72 4.50 7.99 0.93 18.5 0.83 0.75 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 72 5.01 10.3 0.85 17.7 0.81 0.74 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 72 5.11 12.1 0.82 18.5 0.83 0.83 
  Jan-02 Dec-07 72 5.35 14.9 0.78 20.2 0.85 0.88 
South Africa Jan-90 Dec-95 72 3.97 16.6 0.95 60.6 0.98 1.80 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 72 3.40 10.2 1.00 44.3 0.97 1.55 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 72 3.14 9.90 1.02 47.2 0.97 1.60 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72 3.56 9.94 0.98 42.2 0.96 1.16 
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Table D1: Long -Run Model Analysis               
 Rolling Sample Obs Intercept Slope Adj. R2 DW 
Country From To   Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat     
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72 3.68 9.87 0.98 41.1 0.96 1.23 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 2.77 7.00 1.03 40.5 0.96 1.06 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 72 2.56 7.69 1.04 47.1 0.97 0.94 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 72 2.93 9.89 1.01 49.7 0.97 0.92 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 72 3.22 11.2 1.00 47.4 0.97 0.85 
 Jan-99 Dec-04 72 3.47 14.8 0.98 48.8 0.97 0.42 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 72 3.99 19.9 0.93 48.7 0.97 0.11 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 72 3.79 26.0 0.96 64.6 0.98 0.17 
  Jan-02 Dec-07  Near Singular Matrix       
Swaziland Jan-90 Dec-95 72 2.72 8.36 1.02 39.0 0.96 0.33 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 72 3.15 22.1 0.99 91.1 0.99 0.85 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 72 3.14 38.4 0.99 166.5 1.00 1.55 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72 3.10 43.5 0.99 201.4 1.00 1.71 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72 2.98 89.0 1.00 445.3 1.00 2.04 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 2.98 91.7 1.00 457.6 1.00 2.04 
 Jan-96 Dec-01  Near Singular Matrix    
 Jan-97 Dec-02  Near Singular Matrix    
 Jan-98 Dec-03  Near Singular Matrix    
 Jan-99 Dec-04 72 3.78 44.9 0.94 128.0 1.00 0.16 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 72 4.18 61.0 0.90 134.3 1.00 0.26 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 72 4.19 69.1 0.90 144.2 1.00 0.28 
  Jan-02 Dec-07 72 4.18 75.2 0.91 157.3 1.00 0.30 
Tanzania Jan-90 Dec-95 72 28.6 27.8 0.27 8.78 0.64 0.52 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 72 27.7 25.3 0.30 8.81 0.58 0.79 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 72 25.7 26.9 0.33 10.2 0.61 0.37 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72 22.6 18.5 0.39 9.30 0.55 0.26 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72 18.8 14.2 0.48 10.6 0.61 0.27 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 16.1 14.4 0.53 12.4 0.68 0.28 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 72 13.8 9.16 0.65 7.44 0.43 0.17 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 72 16.0 13.8 0.40 4.94 0.25 0.09 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 72 13.5 12.7 0.46 6.05 0.33 0.09 
 Jan-99 Dec-04 72 14.3 9.72 0.31 2.72 0.08 0.05 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 72 17.1 11.8 -0.01 -0.13 -0.01 0.05 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 72 19.9 19.8 -0.32 -4.07 0.18 0.13 
  Jan-02 Dec-07 72 15.0 31.7 0.02 0.47 -0.01 0.37 
Zambia Jan-90 Dec-95 72 8.29 3.73 1.05 31.2 0.95 0.86 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 72 7.24 3.68 1.06 33.7 0.95 0.84 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 72 13.2 7.16 0.98 31.1 0.93 0.50 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72 14.1 7.82 0.98 31.8 0.94 0.53 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72 19.0 8.65 0.83 16.5 0.84 0.34 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 24.2 12.7 0.61 10.9 0.69 0.19 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 72 24.5 12.6 0.62 11.2 0.70 0.21 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 72 25.9 11.7 0.58 8.05 0.55 0.18 
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Table D1: Long -Run Model Analysis               
 Rolling Sample Obs Intercept Slope Adj. R2 DW 
Country From To   Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat     
 Jan-98 Dec-03 72 23.1 13.3 0.63 11.1 0.70 0.50 
 Jan-99 Dec-04 72 24.9 25.2 0.58 16.7 0.82 0.53 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 72 21.7 22.4 0.67 18.4 0.83 0.37 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 72 18.9 21.5 0.77 21.3 0.86 0.33 
 Jan-02 Dec-07 72 14.1 12.3 0.98 16.5 0.79 0.26 
Note: In cases where results for the entire rolling window were not reported this indicates that there was either 
an insufficient number of data observations to estimate the model or the series were representative of a near 
singular matrix. 
 
Source: Estimates by author.
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APPENDIX E: 
SHORT-RUN ROLLING REGRESSION MODEL SUMMARY 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table E1: Short- Run Model Analysis                       
 Rolling Sample Obs Intercept Slope Lag Dep 
Adj. 
R2 DW ECM(s) ML 
Country From To   Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat     Coeff t-stat Coeff 
Botswana Jan-90 Dec-95 72 0.03 0.57 0.63 7.46 -0.01 -0.10 0.52 2.03 -0.27 -3.68 1.38 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 72 0.04 1.08 0.54 4.51 -0.22 -2.21 0.28 1.76 -0.22 -2.21 2.05 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 72 0.02 0.90 0.42 4.78 -0.15 -1.66 0.45 2.04 -0.32 -4.02 1.78 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72 0.00 -0.08 0.35 3.39 -0.10 -0.89 0.26 2.12    
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72 0.02 1.09 0.08 0.83 -0.06 -0.52 0.09 1.94 -0.17 -2.80 5.35 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 0.02 1.33 0.14 2.53 0.08 0.69 0.13 1.91 -0.16 -3.11 5.36 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 72 0.01 0.84 0.24 4.67 0.06 0.60 0.33 2.00 -0.40 -5.58 1.89 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 72 0.02 1.56 0.26 4.94 0.12 1.23 0.35 2.00 -0.42 -5.65 1.76 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 72 0.02 1.47 0.31 5.74 0.06 0.63 0.39 2.01 -0.47 -5.92 1.47 
 Jan-99 Dec-04 72 0.01 0.80 0.28 5.83 0.15 1.64 0.36 1.95 -0.36 -4.23 2.01 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 72 0.01 0.49 0.28 6.00 0.21 2.26 0.38 1.82 -0.41 -4.64 1.78 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 72 0.00 -0.10 0.99 80.94 0.02 1.85 0.99 1.98 -0.87 -7.25 0.01 
  Jan-02 Dec-07 72 0.00 0.04 0.97 73.60 0.03 2.01 0.99 2.01 -0.85 -7.21 0.04 
Lesotho Jan-90 Dec-95 72 -0.04 -0.25 0.59 1.99 -0.32 -2.86 0.33 2.11 -0.34 -2.91 1.20 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 72 -0.07 -0.52 0.95 3.22 -0.12 -0.95 0.38 1.97 -0.72 -4.24 0.06 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 72 -0.02 -0.16 0.94 3.07 -0.11 -0.86 0.40 1.97 -0.75 -4.42 0.08 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72 0.04 0.31 0.99 6.41 -0.10 -0.99 0.51 2.00 -0.80 -5.12 0.01 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72 -0.01 -0.09 0.75 8.08 -0.05 -0.54 0.48 2.03 -0.12 -1.35 2.09 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 0.00 -0.05 0.57 6.69 -0.02 -0.20 0.39 1.92 -0.12 -1.89 3.61 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 72 0.02 0.23 0.56 6.58 0.00 0.00 0.39 2.03 -0.13 -2.10 3.25 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 72 -0.01 -0.09 0.52 6.77 -0.01 -0.07 0.40 2.03 -0.12 -1.93 4.10 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 72 -0.06 -0.70 0.51 6.26 0.04 0.34 0.36 2.00    
 Jan-99 Dec-04 72 -0.13 -1.96 0.12 1.24 -0.02 -0.15 -0.01 1.55    
 Jan-00 Dec-05 72 -0.06 -1.31 0.08 1.28 0.18 1.46 0.04 2.01    
 Jan-01 Dec-06 72 -0.03 -0.65 0.11 1.40 0.26 2.06 0.08 2.00    
  Jan-02 Dec-07 72 -0.01 -0.14 0.16 1.80 0.22 1.72 0.07 2.06       
Madagascar Jan-90 Dec-95 72 0.12 1.13 0.31 3.64 -0.20 -1.68 0.27 1.93 -0.26 -2.66 2.65 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 72 0.10 1.04 0.27 3.83 -0.28 -2.68 0.33 1.88 -0.23 -3.33 3.23 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 72 0.09 0.93 0.24 3.42 -0.27 -2.47 0.28 1.95 -0.15 -3.00 5.02 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72 0.04 0.44 0.23 3.14 -0.23 -2.23 0.32 1.95 -0.22 -3.69 3.51 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72 0.04 0.45 0.16 2.37 -0.20 -1.93 0.35 1.97 -0.30 -4.51 2.76 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 -0.02 -0.28 0.15 2.32 -0.18 -1.74 0.28 1.88 -0.23 -4.12 3.69 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 72 -0.15 -2.10 0.14 2.49 -0.16 -1.40 0.15 2.01 -0.12 -2.84 7.26 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 72 -0.07 -1.48 0.09 1.67 -0.04 -0.33 0.08 2.01 -0.08 -2.29 12.2 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 72 -0.04 -1.28 0.06 1.79 0.02 0.16 0.01 2.00    
 Jan-99 Dec-04 72 -0.02 -0.75 0.03 1.08 -0.01 -0.13 0.10 2.01 -0.12 -2.96 8.38 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 72 -0.01 -0.21 0.04 0.97 0.00 -0.04 0.11 2.02 -0.15 -3.16 6.25 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 72 0.05 0.84 0.04 0.62 0.00 0.04 -0.03 2.02    
  Jan-02 Dec-07 72 0.28 0.95 0.02 0.06 0.00 0.02 -0.04 2.00       
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Table E1: Short- Run Model Analysis                       
 Rolling Sample Obs Intercept Slope Lag Dep 
Adj. 
R2 DW ECM(s) ML 
Country From To   Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat     Coeff t-stat Coeff 
Malawi Jan-90 Dec-95 72 0.09 0.28 0.49 2.98 0.08 0.70 0.23 1.95 -0.29 -3.58 1.76 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 72 0.07 0.24 0.58 4.89 0.07 0.72 0.37 1.93 -0.29 -3.57 1.43 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 72 0.01 0.03 0.59 4.89 0.08 0.77 0.36 1.94 -0.29 -3.54 1.44 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72 0.00 -0.01 0.74 6.96 0.10 1.12 0.47 1.94 -0.27 -3.28 0.99 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72 0.04 0.12 0.78 7.11 0.08 0.85 0.47 1.96 -0.24 -3.10 0.92 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 0.27 1.14 1.07 11.2 0.05 0.78 0.69 2.06 -0.37 -5.08 0.18 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 72 0.04 0.14 0.38 5.69 -0.01 -0.09 0.31 2.03 -0.26 -3.12 2.37 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 72 0.20 0.83 0.33 5.05 -0.06 -0.62 0.26 2.03 -0.25 -3.22 2.72 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 72 0.17 0.70 0.37 5.99 -0.07 -0.72 0.38 1.94 -0.43 -4.84 1.47 
 Jan-99 Dec-04 72 -0.21 -0.93 0.35 5.95 -0.10 -0.97 0.34 1.97 -0.39 -3.93 1.67 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 72 -0.22 -1.03 0.36 6.30 -0.13 -1.35 0.37 1.98 -0.40 -4.29 1.61 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 72 -0.04 -0.26 0.50 9.19 -0.12 -1.47 0.57 1.73 -0.59 -7.40 0.84 
  Jan-02 Dec-07 72 0.02 0.29 0.84 25.06 0.04 1.04 0.90 2.27 -0.40 -4.06 0.40 
Mozambique Jan-90 Dec-95  Insufficient number of data observations to estimate model    
 Jan-91 Dec-96  Insufficient number of data observations to estimate model    
 Jan-92 Dec-97  Insufficient number of data observations to estimate model    
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72 -0.68 -0.88 -0.18 -0.37 0.34 1.19 0.30 1.63 -0.91 -2.93 1.30 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72 -0.46 -1.03 -0.09 -0.23 0.12 0.62 0.18 1.71 -0.46 -2.91 2.35 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 -0.33 -1.09 -0.05 -0.15 0.08 0.51 0.18 1.74 -0.38 -3.31 2.73 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 72 -0.18 -0.73 -0.04 -0.14 0.10 0.72 0.11 1.80 -0.30 -3.06 3.48 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 72 -0.08 -0.36 -0.04 -0.14 0.08 0.60 0.01 1.91 -0.13 -1.83 8.10 
 Jan-98 Dec-03  Near Singular Matrix         
 Jan-99 Dec-04  Near Singular Matrix         
 Jan-00 Dec-05  Near Singular Matrix         
 Jan-01 Dec-06  Near Singular Matrix         
  Jan-02 Dec-07  Near Singular Matrix                 
Namibia Jan-90 Dec-95 72 -0.07 -0.97 -0.06 -0.38 -0.12 -1.15 0.44 1.81 -0.65 -5.80 1.63 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 72 -0.07 -0.81 -0.19 -0.90 -0.17 -1.41 0.48 1.88 -0.74 -5.92 1.62 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 72 -0.03 -0.38 -0.11 -0.56 -0.13 -1.25 0.39 1.91 -0.63 -5.65 1.77 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72 0.02 0.20 0.26 1.73 -0.15 -1.46 0.38 1.90 -0.56 -5.25 1.32 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72 0.01 0.16 0.19 1.20 -0.23 -2.31 0.36 1.92 -0.44 -4.49 1.83 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 -0.01 -0.09 0.20 1.25 -0.19 -1.96 0.41 1.97 -0.54 -5.26 1.49 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 72 -0.05 -0.61 0.14 0.89 -0.15 -1.49 0.43 1.99 -0.64 -5.93 1.35 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 72 -0.07 -0.96 0.17 1.36 -0.25 -2.67 0.42 2.01 -0.46 -5.90 1.82 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 72 -0.12 -1.49 0.13 1.04 -0.26 -2.88 0.45 1.98 -0.49 -6.26 1.79 
 Jan-99 Dec-04 72 -0.19 -2.51 -0.01 -0.05 -0.27 -2.83 0.41 1.97 -0.45 -5.93 2.26 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 72 -0.09 -1.56 -0.11 -0.72 -0.26 -2.78 0.41 1.95 -0.44 -5.93 2.52 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 72 -0.06 -1.14 -0.13 -0.92 -0.24 -2.68 0.48 1.99 -0.54 -7.16 2.09 
  Jan-02 Dec-07 72 0.02 0.48 -0.07 -0.46 -0.24 -2.67 0.51 1.89 -0.61 -7.17 1.75 
South Africa Jan-90 Dec-95 72 -0.02 -0.64 0.40 5.67 0.10 1.44 0.65 1.79 -0.89 -10.20 0.67 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 72 0.01 0.15 0.57 6.73 0.22 2.76 0.59 1.87 -0.80 -8.05 0.55 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 72 0.00 0.06 0.65 8.15 0.20 2.74 0.63 1.89 -0.81 -7.90 0.43 
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Table E1: Short- Run Model Analysis                       
 Rolling Sample Obs Intercept Slope Lag Dep 
Adj. 
R2 DW ECM(s) ML 
Country From To   Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat     Coeff t-stat Coeff 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72 0.04 1.03 0.42 5.58 0.15 2.48 0.77 1.94 -0.85 -9.27 0.68 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72 0.00 0.09 0.46 6.32 0.15 2.55 0.78 2.00 -0.87 -9.22 0.62 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 -0.02 -0.43 0.48 6.05 0.14 2.22 0.74 1.93 -0.73 -8.12 0.71 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 72 -0.03 -0.69 0.55 7.01 0.13 1.85 0.71 2.03 -0.62 -7.01 0.73 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 72 -0.01 -0.30 0.61 8.17 0.11 1.63 0.71 2.16 -0.57 -6.26 0.68 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 72 -0.03 -0.61 0.64 8.80 0.10 1.46 0.73 2.19 -0.54 -5.90 0.67 
 Jan-99 Dec-04 72 -0.03 -0.96 0.85 13.8 -0.03 -0.56 0.75 2.65 -0.21 -3.00 0.73 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 72 0.01 0.36 0.87 27.6 0.05 1.34 0.92 2.06 -0.06 -1.55 2.12 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 72 0.01 0.97 0.90 30.9 0.05 1.44 0.94 2.11 -0.14 -2.86 0.74 
  Jan-02 Dec-07  Near Singular Matrix                 
Swaziland Jan-90 Dec-95 72 0.01 0.67 0.86 19.7 0.09 1.84 0.86 2.46 -0.19 -3.07 0.76 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 72 0.01 0.95 0.86 22.9 0.03 0.79 0.89 2.11 -0.53 -5.41 0.26 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 72 0.00 0.05 0.87 29.1 0.01 0.30 0.93 2.00 -0.84 -7.49 0.15 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72 0.01 -1.45 0.96 85.9 0.01 1.05 0.99 2.07 -0.83 -16.1 0.05 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72 0.00 0.02 0.97 110.1 0.01 0.64 0.99 2.01 -0.99 -8.31 0.03 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 0.00 -0.12 0.97 110.5 0.01 0.55 0.99 1.13 -1.00 -8.36 0.03 
 Jan-96 Dec-01  Near Singular Matrix         
 Jan-97 Dec-02  Near Singular Matrix         
 Jan-98 Dec-03  Near Singular Matrix         
 Jan-99 Dec-04 72 0.00 -0.09 0.97 65.4 -0.02 -1.58 0.99 2.05 -0.08 -1.65 0.32 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 72 0.00 0.46 0.96 57.5 -0.04 -2.18 0.98 2.16 -0.08 -1.49 0.48 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 72 0.01 0.76 0.96 61.2 -0.03 -2.06 0.98 2.15 -0.09 -1.49 0.42 
  Jan-02 Dec-07 72 0.01 1.17 0.96 61.1 -0.03 -2.06 0.98 2.13 -0.14 -2.18 0.26 
Tanzania Jan-90 Dec-95 72 0.37 1.22 0.04 0.80 -0.13 -0.67 -0.05 2.02    
 Jan-91 Dec-96 72 0.18 0.40 0.37 5.56 -0.36 -1.48 0.36 1.48 -0.31 -2.13 2.05 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 72 -0.10 -0.44 0.08 1.80 -0.04 -0.31 0.02 2.00    
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72 -0.13 -0.61 0.08 1.88 -0.06 -0.48 0.01 2.00    
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72 -0.28 -1.53 0.09 2.47 -0.09 -0.71 0.07 1.98 -0.07 -1.84 13.5 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 -0.13 -0.73 0.14 3.19 -0.12 -1.05 0.15 1.93 -0.12 -2.89 7.29 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 72 -0.35 -3.19 0.09 1.83 -0.18 -1.67 0.21 1.56 -0.11 -4.09 7.95 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 72 -0.19 -2.43 0.07 1.36 -0.02 -0.19 0.05 1.92 -0.07 -2.35 13.4 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 72 -0.14 -1.81 0.12 2.09 0.00 0.02 0.03 1.92    
 Jan-99 Dec-04 72 -0.14 -1.75 0.08 1.07 -0.08 -0.63 -0.01 1.88    
 Jan-00 Dec-05 72 -0.08 -0.96 0.05 0.47 -0.03 -0.25 -0.02 2.00    
 Jan-01 Dec-06 72 -0.10 -1.27 -0.05 -0.70 -0.06 -0.51 0.09 1.97 -0.12 -3.00 8.44 
  Jan-02 Dec-07 72 -0.03 -0.37 0.01 0.13 -0.10 -0.37 0.08 2.03 -0.19 -2.53 5.27 
Zambia Jan-90 Dec-95 72 0.05 0.07 0.66 7.33 0.23 2.40 0.72 1.63 -0.31 -2.84 1.12 
 Jan-91 Dec-96 72 0.07 0.12 0.63 7.87 0.24 2.81 0.71 1.63 -0.28 -3.06 1.31 
 Jan-92 Dec-97 72 0.06 0.13 0.58 8.10 0.27 3.34 0.70 1.64 -0.20 -2.90 2.09 
 Jan-93 Dec-98 72 -0.64 -1.49 0.44 6.82 0.27 3.73 0.68 1.27 -0.23 -3.83 2.42 
 Jan-94 Dec-99 72 -0.51 -1.91 0.26 5.79 0.44 5.13 0.71 1.92 -0.12 -2.85 6.23 
 Jan-95 Dec-00 72 -0.22 -1.02 0.22 2.86 0.05 0.43 0.31 1.54 -0.15 -2.77 5.16 
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Table E1: Short- Run Model Analysis                       
 Rolling Sample Obs Intercept Slope Lag Dep 
Adj. 
R2 DW ECM(s) ML 
Country From To   Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat     Coeff t-stat Coeff 
 Jan-96 Dec-01 72 -0.23 -0.96 0.27 3.08 0.10 0.85 0.29 1.60 -0.14 -2.26 5.3 
 Jan-97 Dec-02 72 -0.35 -1.47 0.36 3.26 0.02 0.16 0.29 1.60 -0.13 -1.94 5.12 
 Jan-98 Dec-03 72 -0.08 -0.37 0.24 2.80 -0.03 -0.28 0.18 1.57 -0.21 -2.30 3.54 
 Jan-99 Dec-04 72 -0.17 -0.89 0.23 3.18 -0.02 -0.14 0.25 1.66 -0.26 -3.32 2.93 
 Jan-00 Dec-05 72 -0.11 -0.68 0.22 3.40 0.05 0.46 0.23 2.04 -0.18 -3.21 4.32 
 Jan-01 Dec-06 72 -0.27 -1.83 0.17 2.75 0.00 -0.04 0.15 2.30 -0.13 -2.92 6.46 
  Jan-02 Dec-07 72 -0.50 -3.83 0.09 1.43 -0.23 -1.93 0.10 1.94 -0.07 -2.61 12.2 
Notes: Symm Adj. – speed of adjustment coefficient calculated as equation (4) in Chapter 3.  In cases where the 
ECM(s) and the Symmetric Adjustment Coefficient are not reported this signifies rolling windows where an 
error correction model (ECM) could not be estimated because there was no evidence of a cointegrating 
relationship between the central bank rate (CBR) and the lending rate (LR). In cases where results for the entire 
rolling window were not reported this indicates that there was either an insufficient number of data observations 
to estimate the model or the series were representative of a near singular matrix. 
 
Source: Estimates by author.  
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